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Wilderness: The Last Frontiert
Glen 0. Robinson*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Among the array of environmental issues, few have so captured the fancy and the fantasy of the environmentally concerned as wilderness preservation. This Article traces the evolution of wilderness preservation and analyzes the administrative, legal, and economic issues of wilderness preservation as a
land-use policy. The focal point of the Article is the national
forests inasmuch as they comprise the dominant part of the existing and potential future area of wilderness and Forest Service policies have been the dominant element in both the past
and current controversies surrounding wilderness preservation.
However, the issues and my comments on them have a general
relevance not confined either to the national forests or to Forest
Service policy.
The values of wilderness have been variously expressed.
Some commentators have stressed its scientific and ecological
value,' and others its recreational value. 2 But whatever particularized value is specified, ultimate refuge is usually taken in
some aesthetic sense. Robert Marshall described wilderness as
all the senses "harmonized with immensity into a form of beauty
which to many human beings is the most perfect experience of
the earth."3 Even many who have never been within sight of a

t Copyright 1974, Glen 0. Robinson.
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota (on leave); since
July 1974, Commissioner, Federal Communications Commission. The
original version of this article was written as part of a larger study of
the United States Forest Service and Forest Resource Policy. I am
grateful to Resources for the Future, the University of Minnesota, and
the United States Administrative Conference for providing financial
support for the larger study, and to the Forest Service for its cooperation and assistance. Needless to say, none of the above should
be held accountable for the facts or opinions herein, nor should my
present employer, the Federal Communications Commission, to which I
was appointed after this was written.
1. See generally OuTDooR REcREATIox REsouRcEs REmViw Comivssiox, SmUDY REPORT No. 3, WmnumRss AND RECRETION 31-33 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as ORRRC REPORT No. 3]; THE MEANING OF WILDERNESS TO SCIENCE (D.Brower ed. 1960).
2. See ORRRC REPORT No. 3, supra note 1, at 28-31.
3, In the Wilderness, Tw Livmr Wm..nRNss, Summer, 1954, at ii
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real wilderness have at least some dim perception of its enchantment, thanks in part to the rich profusion of books celebrating its beauty in picture and poetry. On the other hand, to
many who have had neither direct nor vicarious experience
with wilderness, the preservationist who insists wilderness be
preserved at the sacrifice of other land uses often appears as
an irrepressible romantic, or a wild-eyed zealot, depending on
the intensity of his ardor. As viewed by the steely-eyed pragmatist, the preservationist preaches an elitist creed in urging
that land be taken out of uses serving large numbers of the
public in favor of restricting it to selective use by a mere handful
of enthusiasts (by definition the wilderness cannot accommodate more).
This objection surely has substance when measured against the demands of some preservationists; and yet the
extremes of one end of the spectrum need not propel us to the
extremes of the other. The wonder of wilderness and the value
of its preservation are recognized by many who could scarcely
be described as romantic, let alone fanatic.
It is not simply in a personal acquaintance with pristine nature that wilderness has meaning and value. It has a larger social and cultural significance as well. It is the symbol of what
modern civilization has lost. Wallace Stegner has eloquently
expressed this:
We need wilderness preserved-as much of it as is still left, and
as many kinds-because it was the challenge against which our
character as a people was formed. The reminder and the reassurance that it is still there is good for our spiritual health even
if we never once in ten years set foot in it. It is good for us
when we are young, because of the incomparable sanity it can
bring briefly, as vacation and rest, into our insane lives. It is
important to us when we are old
4 simply because it is thereimportant, that is, simply as idea.
In more prosaic, homely terms, wilderness dramatizes the opportunity cost of civilization, what we have given up in "natural"
values to obtain the "artificial" benefits of social living. And in
an'age in which the social "benefits" are all too visibly promoted (by advertising among other things), there is special need
to retain at least some visible reminder of our loss. Whatever
the rationale, it is hard to deny the existence of a strong instinct for maintaining some tie, some residual hold upon a more
primitive life, and it is from this instinct that the concept of wilderness ultimately derives its support.
(editorial).

For a sampling of other, comparable expressions see R.
AND THE AmRcAN MIND (rev. ed. 1973) [hereinafter

NASH, WI .DsmRss

cited as NASH].
4. Quoted in ORRRPC I EPo

No. 3, supra note 1, at 34.
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The instinct is not a genetic characteristic, to be sure; it is,
in fact, the product of very modern times. 5 Despite its ancient
presence at the frontier of man's social world, the concept of wilderness is of recent origin. Only now that modern man is faced
with its near elimination has the idea of wilderness and the desire for its preservation captured his imagination. As with most
things, value comes from scarcity. To the colonist and to the pioneer, wilderness was just a condition of the land. There was
no developed social consciousness about wilderness, no concept
of it as a thing of nature, to be preserved, cherished, valued.
Of course, there were those who specially valued the wilderness
and its beauty, but in a new world, in which subsistence was a
daily problem, this was a luxury for which little time was afforded. And any such appreciation had to be tempered with
the harsh reality that the wilderness condition was the relentless barrier to social settlement. Thus, for most persons wilderness was only something to be overcome. The value of the
natural environment lay only in its ability to sustain the physical needs of people pursuing the Biblical injunction to subdue
and conquer the earth.
After basic subsistence had been secured from the wilderness, pioneering and economic expansion extended the conquest.
The early efforts were largely individual and private; these had
an impact on the frontier, though a limited one. The real thrust
of expansion followed the Civil War and was heavily promoted
by the federal government (and, to a much lesser degree, by state
and local governments) through land grants to public and private enterprise and grants of homesteads to individual pioneers.
In the face of railroads, wagon trains-and in their wake, settlements and cities-the frontier quickly disappeared, and with it
some (though by no means all) of the wilderness.
In the midst of expansion, however, some contended for
government protection and preservation of large tracts of land.
A proposal was made as early as 1832 by George Catlin, painter
of the Indian West, to preserve vast areas of the Great Plains for
the benefit of Indians and buffalo. 6 His proposal received little
serious attention. However, the sentiment for preservation persisted and reappeared, in modified form, in 1864, when Congress
ceded lands in Yosemite Valley and Mariposa Grove in California, and eight years later when it created the first national park,
5. NASH, supra note 3, gives an excellent history of the wilderness
concept, from which I have greatly drawn in the following discussion.
6. NASH, supra note 3, at 100-01.
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Yellowstone. But national parks were not established with the
intention of preserving wilderness as such; the main purpose was
to secure these areas for public recreational use and to prevent
them from being monopolized by private interests which, but
for the withdrawal into national parks, would patent or homestead the lands. Essentially the decision was a pragmatic one
7
which gave little attention to preservation of wilderness values.
The significance of the withdrawals of these lands from private
use is not that they represented a searching exploration or
acceptance of the value of wilderness as such, but that they evidenced the beginning of a public land-use philosophy.
The philosophy which would later give the wilderness preservation movement its intellectual substance, however, had been
developing. As urban life became more common, people took to
the wilds for recreation or other pursuits. The early wilderness
promoters were mostly idealists, romantics in the vein of Emerson, Thoreau, and later Muir, who saw wilderness as a source of
the insight and refreshment which could best come from untrammeled nature. Ecologist George Perkins Marsh gave important support to later preservationists by arguing that unthinking
destruction of the wilds would disrupt the natural process on
which men ultimately depend for survival.8
Toward the end of the nineteenth century a conservation
movement, which was to contain and nurture the germ of
the wilderness preservation effort, began to emerge. The passage of the Forest Reserves Act of 18919 provided the first comprehensive vehicle by which wilderness could be initially protected, and also showed that conservationists were starting to
have some noticeable effect on land-use policy. The Act, however, was not primarily preservationist. Conservationists of all
persuasions tended to band together against the "resource raiders" (as Stewart Udall has called the timber and mining interests' 0 ). Thus, preservationist leaders such as John Muir did
support the Act," but so did multiple-use oriented foresters.
The lines of future conflict between managed use--"conservation"--and preservation were soon to emerge, however, with the
formation of the Sierra Club in 1895 and the development of the
Forest Service after 1905.
7. See W. EvwamAR, THE NATIONAL PARE: SERVICE (1972); J. IsE,
OUR NATIONAL PAK Poracy (1961).
8. See G.MAii MA Am NAram 327 (1867).
9. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1103.
10. S. UDALL, TnE QuiEr CRisis 64-80 (1963),
41. NAsa, supra note 3. at 133,

1974]

WILDERNESS

Between 1906 and 1913 a skirmish took place between the advocates of wilderness preservation and wilderness resource utilization. San Francisco, which had just been shaken by an
earthquake, urgently renewed its request that it be permitted to
build a dam in the Hetch-Hetchy Valley on the Yosemite reservation.12 John Muir and Robert Underwood Johnson, a publisher and wilderness lover, campaigned against the dam, blocked
it in Congress for seven years, and convinced Theodore Roosevelt to change his position and oppose the dam (contrary to the
advice of Gifford Pinchot, then Chief of the Forest Service).
As never before, the conflict between preservation and use was
starkly dramatized. The intense debate was an early rehearsal
of controversies to come. Preservationists urged recognition of
spiritual, aesthetic, and recreational values, while dam builders
explained that wilderness, however desirable, must yield to the
greater good represented by material progress. The builders
won. It was a celebrated victory, but probably a pyrrhic one
for, as John Muir put it, "the conscience of the whole country
was aroused from sleep."'13 To preservationists Hetch-Hetchy
became the Alamo of wilderness, a symbol and a call to arms.
The national forests soon became the principal battlefield.
II.

HISTORY OF WILDERNESS PRESERVATION

The important imprint of history on the current scheme of
wilderness preservation calls for a somewhat extended review
of the evolution of the preservation policy. Since the relevant
history of wilderness preservation centers largely on Forest
Service policies, so does the discussion which follows. The Forest Service early set itself against any general policy of preservation for its own sake. Gifford Pinchot, the "father" of the Forest
Service,14 and the dominant figure in the formative years of forest conservation, was no John Muir. He believed forest resources
should be actively managed to satisfy the needs of those who
would benefit most from their use:
12. On the Hetch-Hetchy episode see W. EVERHART, supra note 7, at
15-17; J. Isr, supra note 7, at 85-96; NAsH, supranote 3, at 161-81.
13. Quoted in W. EVERHART, supra note 7, at 16.
14. The ancestry of the Forest Service antedates Pinchot by more
than a decade. However, it was under Pinchot that the small Division
of Forestry, which he joined in 1898, became (in 1905) the Forest Service
and acquired management jurisdiction over the national forests (then the
"forest reserves"). On Pinchot generally, see M. MCGEAny, GnFoRD
PNcHOT (1960). On the history of the Forest Service generally, see
S. DANA, FOREST AND RANGE PoLicy: ITS DEvELOPmENqT n- THE UNIrED
$TATES (1956).
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The object of our forest policy is not to preserve the forests because they are beautiful... or because they are refuges for the
wild creatures of the wilderness . . . but . . . [is] the making
of prosperous homes ....
Every other consideration comes as
secondary.15
Pinchot's philosophy steered early policy towards productive
managed use and away from wilderness preservation, but his
was not the sole influence. Local interests were-and continue to
be-a major influence, and they have tended to be less enthusiastic supporters of wilderness than nonlocal interests, at least
where significant costs to the local economy are involved.16
However, the emergence of outdoor recreation as an important concern of the Forest Service brought with it some recognition of the need for wilderness preservation. The first wilderness policies were originated at local levels by officers who
had authority, within their budgets, to incorporate recreational
considerations into forest-use planning. Aldo Leopold, then an
assistant district forester in the district (districts were called
regions after 1930) encompassing New Mexico and Arizona, provided a major initial impetus for wilderness preservation. When
plans were laid to put roads into the roadless areas of the Gila
National Forest, Leopold, aware that the Gila area was the last
big roadless area in the district, proposed that the area be withheld from road development and maintained as a wilderness preserve. 17 The Gila fit Leopold's description of an area that should
be preserved as wilderness: it was large and could support an
extended pack trip, it had abundant game, its preservation
would not duplicate other preservation efforts, its timber was not
economically accessible, and its mineral potential was not such
that it had induced miners to enter the area.' 8 When his proposal evoked little initial response of any kind from the public
or from the Service, Leopold attempted to stimulate interest
through a series of articles in which he described a philosophy
of wilderness protection that became influential in shaping sub15. Quoted in S. HAYs, CONSERVATION AND TEE GOSPEL OF E
ciFcINCY
42 (1959). See also G. PiNcHOT, BREAKIG NEw GROUND 31-32, 183-85,
266 (1947).
16. This is well illustrated by the controversy over wilderness proposals in West Virginia, discussed in K.P. DAVIS, et al., FEDERAL PUBLIc
LAD LAws AND POLICIES RLMATING TO MULTIPLE-USE OF PUBLIC LANDS,
A STUDY FOR THE PUBLIC LAN LAw REv-w COMMISSION 32-37 (rev. ed.
1970) [hereinafter cited as DAvis, et al.].
17. For a full account of this early history, from which I have
drawn heavily, see J. Gilligan, The Development of Policy and Administration of Forest Service Primitive and Wilderness Areas, 1954 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Michigan).
18. ORRRC REPORT No. 3, supranote 1, at 115, 286.
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sequent Forest Service wilderness policies. Leopold's recommendations included a proposal that wilderness lands be placed immediately in a kind of tentative, holding category and withheld
from development until a permanent decision could be made on
the basis of the popular will. For the longer term he urged permanent preservation of some public lands, for which wilderness, rather than commercial exploitation, would be the "highest
use."
Although couched in terms of standard, progressive land-use
ideas, Leopold's proposals were a significant extension of those
concepts. Critics, inside and outside the Forest Service, charged
that the proposed wilderness program was elitist and would not
result in the greatest good for the greatest number. It was also
said that wilderness preservation would conflict with political
and professional desires to facilitate free and full use of the
national forests. It would complicate fire control. And, it was
finally argued, the National Park Service, established in 1916,
was the federal agency best equipped to provide for the recreational needs of the people; the Forest Service should not compete
with it for management of lands suitable primarily for recreational purposes.
Despite these objections, Leopold, with the support of the
Sierra Club and the Izaak Walton League, convinced the district
forester in 1924 to designate an area of more than 700,000 acres
in the Gila Forest as a wilderness area that would be withheld
from development until needed for some other purpose. It was
the first official wilderness area, but the idea quickly spread,
and by 1925 five other areas in other regions had been designated as wilderness.
Initially the classifications were purely a matter of regional
policy; soon, however, a nationwide wilderness policy began to
emerge within the Forest Service as part of that agency's growing emphasis on recreation. It was recognized by the Forest Service that a wilderness policy would gain it the support of
wilderness advocates for its desired role in recreation; it was
further recognized that by providing unrestricted, undeveloped
recreational opportunities, the Service could distinguish its recreation administration from that of the Park Service, which promoted development of some wild lands. This would enhance the
role of the Forest Service as a recreation agency and justify its
retention of lands whose "highest use" was for recreation. It was
evident also that there was growing public support for some
form of wilderness preservation. For example, a proposal to

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:1

build roads in the Superior National Forest in northern Minnesota evoked vigorous opposition from sportsmen's groups and
the Izaak Walton League. This opposition generated a controversy which eventually had to be resolved by the Secretary of
Agriculture, who in 1926 established the area as a specially protected "canoe area."'19
As finally formulated, however, the wilderness policy placed
few restraints on regional foresters, who retained broad discretion to decide whether lands should be withdrawn for wilderness. In fact, the policy was little more than a recommendation
to the field officials that they should consider wilderness values
in their planning.2 0 In 1928, the Service promulgated formal regulations which gave increased centralized direction to wilderness
protection by providing that wilderness areas-now called "primitive areas"-were to be established and abolished only by action
of the Chief of the Forest Service. However, the new regulations did not greatly restrict foresters in their management efforts. The local officers had power to develop their recommended plans to provide freedom in meeting commercial and
other needs. Wilderness classification did not necessarily preempt continuation of economic activity. The history of the
"primitive areas," 63 of which had been established on national
forest lands by 1933, shows that economic activity had occurred
in many of the areas; logging activities were specifically permitted in 23 areas and affirmatively prohibited in only eight. Grazing took place in 53 areas and was barred in ten. Roads were
expressly prohibited in none of these areas.2 1 Plainly, the concept was a tolerant and flexible one-too much so to satisfy preservationists. When Robert Marshall, one of the founders of the
Wilderness Society, was brought into the Forest Service to head
the Division of Recreation and Lands in 1937, it was a recognition
22
that a change was needed.
19. A detailed history of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area (so
named in 1958) is given in FOREST SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRiCULTURE,
TRAUING GUIaE FOR THE SUPERIOR NATIONAL FOREST (1965); a short, summary history is given in S. DANA, J. ALUsoN & R. CUNNiNGHAm, MInN-ESOTA LANDS 117-28 (1960). Although the area was specially recognized by statute in 1930, Act of July 10, 1930, ch. 881, § 1, 46 Stat. 1020
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 577 (1970)), the basis for management remains
essentially the policy statement of Secretary Jardine in 1926. The area
is, of course, now part of the Wilderness System, though a unique part.
20. See J. Gilligan, supra note 17, at 101, quoting from a 1926 Forest
Service Bulletin.
21. J. Gilligan, supra note 17, at 134.
22. Marshall had previously been head of the Forestry Division in
the Bureau of Indian Affairs. His appointment by Chief Silcox as head
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Marshall, however, was only partially responsible for the
greater attention paid to wilderness. Rivalry with the Department of the Interior, which had earlier played a role in stimulating Forest Service interest in wilderness, was again pushing the
agency in the direction of greater attention to outdoor recreation
and wilderness preservation. Particular impetus came from the
efforts of Interior Secretary Harold Ickes to transfer the Forest
Service to a Department of Conservation 23 and also by the Park
Service's campaign to obtain national forest lands for park use. 24
As part of its increased concern with wilderness, the Forest Service adopted, in 1939, regulations designed to give greater protection and permanence to wilderness areas. Under the new regulations, all primitive areas were to be carefully studied, pared to
eliminate commercial aspects that would be needed in the future, and reclassified from primitive area status to wilderness
of the Division of Recreation and Lands represents one of those exceptional instances when an outsider has been brought into high echelons
of the Forest Service.
23. Ickes' proposal was to reorganize the Department of the Interior
into a Department of Conservation: a proposal made to the Senate in
1935 by S. 2665, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) and to the House in a companion bill, H.R. 7712. Neither the proposal nor the two bills required
the transfer of the Forest Service or national forests into the new department. The composition of the new department was to be determined by
the President, and Ickes himself refused to acknowledge that he sought
such a transfer. See Hearings on H.R. 7712 Before the House Comm.
on Expenditures in Executive Departments,74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1935).
However, it was widely recognized that the logical thrust of the bill, and
the ultimate objective of Ickes himself, was to obtain transfer of the national forests to the new department. See 2 SECRET DIARY OF HAROLD
IcKxs 8 (1954). This realization evoked vigorous opposition to the plan
from the Forest Service and its supporters.
It might be noted that Ickes proposal was neither the first nor
the last effort to consolidate the Forest Service and Interior. In the period 1913 to 1921, bills were successively introduced to transfer the Forest
Service to Interior. See H. CLEPPER, PROFESSIONAL FORESTRY IN THE
UNITED STATES 60 (1971). Clepper attributes these efforts to a political
motive to cripple the Forest Service, which had attracted the particular
ire of Western interests. However, numerous proposals were made from
1920 up to the time of Ickes' efforts, seeking consolidation on the credible
(if exaggerated) rationale of efficiency. Several bills were introduced
during the Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover Administrations.
The failure of these proposals and of Ickes' efforts (the most sustained and vigorous of all the efforts to that time) have not discouraged
proposals for consolidation. The most recent was part of a more ambitious executive reorganization proposal, now moribund, of the Nixon Administration. See H.R. Doe. No. 75, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1971).
24. See, e.g., BROOKIGS INsTrToN, REP. No. 11, INVESTIGATION OF
EXEcUTIVE AGENCIES OF THE GoVERnImvNT, REPORT TO TBE SENATE SELECT
CoMTnuTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE EXECUTIE AGENCIES OF TE GOVERNMENT

88 (1936).
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(areas of 100,000 acres or more) or wild (areas of less than 100,-

25
000 acres) area status.
The 1939 regulations implied, for the first time, a commitment to permanent preservation and to a high degree of protection--both key features of current wilderness policy. Road building, the activity which had given rise to the Service's wilderness policies in the 1920's, was forbidden in wilderness areas.
Exceptions were provided, however, for owners of private lands
situated within the wilderness boundaries and for miners who
could not be ,barred from working their claims -by the Forest
Service alone. Commercial timber harvesting was completely
barred. Summer camps, resorts, or other structures were, except as needed for fire protection, categorically forbidden in the
26
new classified areas.

The process of classification from primitive to wild or wilderness status proved to be a slow one. 27 The Second World War
had a somewhat retarding effect, but probably more significant
was the antagonism of many, within and outside the Service, to
the permanent preservation of wilderness lands. Foresters, unhappy that their fire protection or resource-management programs would 'be complicated by the reclassification of areas and
the proscription of roads from their lands, did not vigorously
press forward with the reclassification efforts. Their unhappiness was reinforced by substantial industry and public resistance. Some local forest officials continued to utilize management
plans promulgated under the old regulations for primitive areas
that had not been reclassified. To correct this, a directive was
issued ordering foresters to manage primitive areas as though
they had been classified and to request permission from Washington before any development efforts were undertaken. 28 Thus
the primitive areas were to be protected until they had been
formally classified. However, the commitment to permanent
25. The 1939 regulations-identified as U-1 (wilderness areas), U2 (wild areas), and U-3 (recreation areas suitable for recreational use,
but not for preservation) -and related directives governing reclassification and interim management of the primitive areas are set forth in J.
Gilligan, supranote 17, at Appendices C-D.
26. See J. Gilligan, supra note 17, at 193.
27. In the first decade that followed, only 2 million of the nearly
14 million acres then in primitive classification were reclassified. While
great increases were later made-some 9 million acres were reclassified
by 1964-they were a late development which occurred only in the shadow of pending legislative proposals for a statutory wilderness system.
28. Circular U-8 (March 30, 1940), reproduced in J. Gilligan, supra
note 17, Appendix D, at 9.
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preservation of wilderness, which the 1939 regulations promised, was blunted. The primitive areas were again placed in a
kind of temporary status which was not changed except as demands for the resources of an area set the formal classification
procedure in motion.
Not only the pace of reclassification but also the results of
the reclassifications that did occur were challenged by preservationists. Particularly distressing to them was the practice of removing valuable timber lands from areas to be classified as wilderness, thereby reducing the size of particular areas. Although between 1939 and 1963 there was a net gain in protected
acreage of more than 130,000 acres, 29 the average size of the protected areas decreased, and of all the previously nonclassified
areas added, only one of the total 14 was of wilderness size. 0
In addition, qualitative changes occurred: the Forest Service exchanged verdant valley timber land for acreage above the timber
line. There was also growing skepticism among preservationists
as to whether the Forest Service would, or could, maintain permanent preservation even for lands classified as wilderness. The
mounting public demand for forest products and forest use only
increased the anxiety that a natural distrust of the bureaucracy
instilled.
Preservationists began to seek surer protection for wilderness
through Congressional action; as early as 1947 the idea of a statutory wilderness system began to take shape. 3 1 However, it was
nearly a decade later when Congress first considered a bill to accomplish this, and some eight more years passed before the
Wilderness Act of 196432 was enacted.
The Act created a system of statutory preservation for some
9.1 million acres of national forest lands already placed in wilderness status by prior Forest Service classification. In addition
to this "instant wilderness," it provided for a 10-year review
by the Forest Service of its primitive areas and for recommendations with regard to inclusion of these areas in the wilderness
system. The Department of the Interior was directed to under29. J. Hughes, Wilderness Land Allocation in a Multiple-Use Forest
Management Framework in the Pacific Northwest 259, 1964 (unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, Michigan State University).
30. Id. at 260.
31. See Mercure & Ross, The Wilderness Act: A Product of Legislative Compromise, in CoNgrEsS AND THE ENvmoswnwT 53 (R. Cooley &
G. Wandersforde-Smith eds. 1970).
32. Act of Sept. 3, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (codified
at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-36 (1970)).
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take a similar review and to make recommendations with regard
to all roadless areas within the national parks and wildlife refuges. Lands included in the system were withdrawn from timber harvesting, road building, commercial activities, and other
uses incompatible with the wilderness character. Uses requiring motor transportation, except as required to gain access
to private lands where the use of motors was well established,
were also banned, and mining exploration is to be prohibited beginning in 1984.
The Act was obviously a victory for preservationists even
though it did not give them all they had demanded. The victory
was not achieved easily, however, and certainly not without prolonged and sometimes -bitter controversy. 38 For the most part,
the debate skirted the foundational question whether any
land should be preserved as wilderness. There were few interests which by the late 1950's would not at least publicly express
some support for the idea of preservation. Thus, the debate was
cast largely in terms of ostensibly subordinate issues: whether
statutory preservation was necessary or desirable; what kinds of
uses should be permitted in preserved areas; and what kinds of
procedures should govern the classification process. Although
these questions seemingly assumed the desirability of preservation, in fact each of the issues vitally affected the basic one of
preservation itself.
The question of statutory, as opposed to administrative,
preservation was of course the very heart of the controversy,
since that was the whole point of the legislation. Preservationists argued that administrative discretion was not adequate.
Not only was it subject to easy reversal, but also it could not be
relied upon to support an expansive recognition of wilderness.
The Forest Service and Park Service initially opposed the concept
of statutory preservation. 34 Both agencies saw the proposed
wilderness legislation as depriving them of administrative discretion and flexibility in managing the forest and park lands.
The Forest Service had special reason to fear the Act.
Quite apart from the fact that the Act would constrain its discretion in regard to wilderness areas, the Forest Service feared that
if particular lands were dedicated by statute to some particular
use, similar treatment of other uses could follow. The effect of
33. On the general legislative history of the act, see Mercure &

Ross, supra note 31; McCloskey, The Wilderness Act of 1964: Its Background and Meaning, 45 ORs. L. Ray. 288 (1966).

34. See Mercure & Ross, supranote 31, at 54.
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this would be to replace the agency's multiple-use system with a
dominant-use scheme. This would also incidentally undercut
the Service's jurisdiction, for if land use were to be prescribed
by statutory classifications of dominant use, a logical further step
might be to reorganize administrative control accordingly. In
particular this might mean that many of the agency's recreationdominant areas would pass from the Forest Service to the National Park Service.
The preservationists attempted to meet this objection by including in the proposed legislation a provision that multiple use
would continue to be the goal of forest policy. It was not enough.
Instead the Forest Service sought, and with enactment of the Multiple-Use and Sustained-Yield Act of 196035 it obtained, separate congressional ratification of the multiple-use principle.
Armed with that security, the Forest Service withdrew its opposition to the Wilderness Act. The Park Service followed suit,
apparently concluding that preservation would not greatly alter
the character of national park lands.
Needless to say, the agencies were not alone in their early opposition to statutory recognition of wilderness; they were joined
by all commercial users of the forests. Timber, livestock, power,
and mining interests all advocated maintaining multiple-use
management and urged that any preservation be accomplished
only by administrative decision, expecting this would serve their
needs more flexibly than would a statutory system.3 6 This was
particularly true of mining and water-development (chiefly hydroelectric power) interests. Under the Forest Service's administrative system of wilderness preservation, their activities had
been largely unhampered. The Forest Service has virtually no
power to limit or regulate mining or the construction of dams
within the national forests. The legislation initially proposed
would have banned both these activities. Small wonder, then,
that both these users of the national forests were particularly
vocal opponents of wilderness legislation.
As suggested by the opposition of the mining and water-development interests, the question whether preservation should
be prescribed by legislation was intimately bound up with the
question of what uses were to be permitted in areas set apart
as wilderness. For activities such as timber harvesting, the statutory scheme would not, of course, have changed the status quo.
35. Act of June 12, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-517, 74 Stat. 215 (codified
at 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-31 (1970)).
36, See McCloQskey, supra note 33, at 298-99.
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Harvesting was already banned by statute on all national parks
and wildlife refuges and by agency regulation on Forest Service
primitive areas. The mining and water-development interests,
whose uses of the land would be curtailed, fought for special
provisions to permit their continued access to wilderness areas;
as the legislation was finally enacted, they did obtain some concessions. Mining was banned, but the ban was not to be effective until 1984. Water development-dam construction-could
continue on a finding by the President that it would be in the
national interest. Except for these activities, the legislation
made little change in the kind and level of protection given wilderness under the prior administrative scheme for, as noted,
parks and wildlife refuges were already protected by statute and
the primitive and wilderness areas of the Forest Service were protected by regulation. One change in regard to the latter areas
was effected by the Act's ban on grazing except where it had
been previously established; but inasmuch as grazing on wilderness lands had been decreasing anyway, 37 this was not an important change.
The last major set of issues in the controversy involved the
determination of what lands should be included in the system,
and, more particularly, how the determination was to be made.
On the one hand, there was no real dispute that lands already
classified as "wild" or "wilderness" (some 9.1 million acres)
should be automatically included as "instant wilderness." Conversely it was generally agreed that parklands and refuges
administered by the Department of the Interior should not be included until after the review to determine whether they were of
predominantly wilderness character and whether preservation
was in other respects appropriate. This left the Forest Service's
primitive areas, for which a final review and determination as to
permanent status had not been made, but which were being preserved as wilderness pending permanent classification. Preservationists urged that these lands be provisionally included in the
system subject to subsequent exclusion only on a showing that
they should not be protected as wilderness. The Forest Service,
among others, opposed such an interim inclusion as unwarranted. Both sides correctly saw the issue as one of procedural strategy and political advantage. Interim inclusion would
not in any way affect the level of protection accorded the lands,
since primitive areas were managed in the same manner as wilderness lands. But it could affect the burden of proof. Preser37.

See ORRRC RsPonT No. 3, supra note 1, at 89,
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vationists reasoned that it would be more difficult for the Forest
Service to exclude an area than not to include it. In the end,
the preservationists lost; however, in retrospect the loss was
probably not important. With relatively minor boundary adjustments-which have actually resulted in an area's being recommended for preservation which was greater than that within
existing primitive area boundaries-all of the primitive areas reviewed to date have been proposed for inclusion and it seems
very unlikely that they will not be favorably acted on by Con38
gress.
Apart from the issue of interim inclusion, the debate over
the process of making wilderness classifications centered on two
questions: first, who should make the initial selection of candidate areas; and second, what should be the role of Congress. As
to the first, the preservationists sought to shift responsibility
away from the Forest Service-a further reflection of that same
distrust of the agency which was a major motive for their seeking the legislation in the first place. Instead, it was proposed to
establish a Wilderness Preservation Council (composed of six citizen members and the heads of the Forest Service, Park Service,
Bureau of Indian Affairs, Fish and Wildlife Service, and Smithsonian Institution) which would examine all agency evaluations
and proposals and transmit them to Congress.3 9 The Council was
intended to guide agency discretion by contributing its own expertise and by providing public scrutiny of the agency's review
process. The Forest Service vigorously opposed the idea of an
outside group reviewing its work, and ultimately the Council
idea was dropped. Under the statute as enacted, the President
transmits reports to Congress. Unlike the Council, which would
have had only the duty to transmit and perhaps to create some
fanfare about the agency reports, the President was given
broader powers in several areas. First, he can not only recommend a change in the boundaries suggested by the agencies, but
he can also recommend that "any contiguous area of national for38. Although individual proposals by the Forest Service have been
frequently attacked by preservationists, it is noteworthy that in the wilderness proposals made through 1973, the Service's recommended additions to the Wilderness System have exceeded by over 400,000 acres the
acreage in the primitive areas which were the basis for those proposals.
U.S. DEP'T OF AcRicuLTuRE & U.S. DEP'T OF rH INTERIoR, NINTH ANNUAL
REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE NATIONAL WILDERNESS PRESERVATION SysTEM, H.R. Doc. No. 194, 93d Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at Appendix I1 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as NINTH ANNuAL REPORT].

39. See, e.g., S.1123, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a) (1959).
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est lands predominantly of wilderness value" 40 be added to the
system. Further, he can declare an increase in the sizes of primitive areas within prescribed limits and, in this manner, increase
the area to be administered as a primitive area while the congressional review is proceeding. The role of the President later
became a pivotal issue in the celebrated case of Parkerv. United
States,41 which involved the classification of lands contiguous to
primitive areas.
As to the role Congress was to play in the wilderness allocation decision, the two competing alternatives were a negative
veto power and a requirement that areas 'be added to the wilderness system only upon enactment of affirmative legislation.
Preservationists sought the former on the assumption that any
requirement of affirmative congressional action could delay, and
in many cases defeat, proposals to add primitive areas to the sys42
tem. Jealous of its power, Congress chose the latter.
III.

WILDERNESS CLASSIFICATION:
THE REVIEW PROCESS

The impact of the Wilderness Act on forest resource policy
is not easy to measure. The "instant" inclusion of some 9.1 million acres already administratively classified as wild or wilderness may have given a more permanent status to those landsso preservationists believe-but that is debatable. While the
future of primitive areas, as well as that of other unclassified
roadless areas, was clearly uncertain, there is little indication that
most of the lands classified as wilderness were any more susceptible to reclassification for nonwilderness use under administrative than under congressional discretion. While one might suppose that administrative classifications are inherently more flexible, in this case that is not so evident; the fact is much of the
land that the Service transferred into the wilderness classification
is land for which other uses, particularly timber production, are
very limited.
The Act did, of course, achieve some additional protections
for wilderness and primitive lands, at least one of which-the
1984 ban on mineral exploration 3 -was beyond the power of the
40. 16U.S.C. § 1132(b) (1970).
41. 309 F. Supp. 593 (D. Colo. 1970), aft'd, 448 F.2d 793 (10th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1972). See text accompanying notes
71-76 infra.
42. 16 U.S.C. § 1132(c) (1970).
43. In Izaak Walton League of America v. St. Clair, 353 F. Supp.
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Forest Service. However, for the most part the differences between administrative and statutory protection do not, at least
yet, appear substantial.
The principal impact of the Act was the mandate to the
Forest Service to review all primitive areas with a view towards
permanent preservation of lands deemed suitable for wilderness
and the mandate to the Department of the Interior to make comparable studies of national park and wildlife refuge lands. Of
course, the Forest Service had already been engaged in a process
of review and reclassification of primitive areas under its 1939
regulations, during the pendency of which primitive lands enjoyed the protection of wilderness. However, until proposals for
a Wilderness Act appeared, the Service's own review and classification efforts had been desultory. It is true that by the
time the Act was passed, some three-fifths of the acreage initially
classified as primitive had finally passed into permanent wilderness. Much of this, however, was accomplished under the shadow
of a proposed statutory scheme that would have mandated such
protection, possibly on terms that would have limited Forest
Service discretion. In short, the pendency of the legislation was
undoubtedly a spur to administrative action. Moreover, without
the mandate of the Act, the process of administrative review
might have ground to a halt as it had done before. Such a slow698 (D. Minn. 1973), a federal district court, finding mining to be incompatible with wilderness preservation, held that the former was prohibited
by the Wilderness Act notwithstanding the fact that the Act very specifically postpones such a ban until 1984. This decision was reversed
on appeal on the basis of the language of the statute permitting mining
until 1984. The appellate court stated:
[T]he factual questions regarding the effect of mining activity
upon the wilderness, and whether a permit should issue with restrictions that would be adequate to protect the wilderness quality of the [Boundary Waters Canoe Area] are those types of
questions peculiarly within the competence of the Forest Service,
and statutorily delegated to it by the Wilderness Act.
497 F.2d 849, 852-53 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3274 (U.S. Nov.
12, 1974). The case was therefore remanded with directions to allow the
Forest Service to determine whether a mining permit should be issued
and to develop a record on that determination.
Attempts have also been made to change the mining provisions of
the Act through legislation. A bill was introduced in the 93d Congress
that would amend the Wilderness Act to prevent mining and mineral exploration on wilderness areas immediately. S. 1010, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973). The Forest Service opposes the bill, preferring the Administration's bill, which would revise the mining laws to allow the federal government to control mineral activity on all public lands through a leasing
system. Hearings on S. 1010 Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands of
the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
60 (1973) (statement of the Chief of the Forest Service).
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down was particularly likely because the Service's review process
had already taken care of the easiest choices-those most suitable for wilderness and those involving the least sacrifice of
other valued uses. Perhaps most important of all, the Act expressed a political mood in favor of substantial wilderness preservation. While this mood did not itself create any new wilderness, it put political pressure on the Forest Service to think
twice before excluding existing primitive areas from the permanent wilderness system. In plain political reality the Act ensured that virtually all of the existing primitive areas would be
proposed for inclusion and that the only real contention would
be over 'boundaries. This in fact has been the case.
As this is written the 10-year review period established by
the Act is nearing an end (although most of the administrative review process has been completed, Congress has yet to consider all of the proposed additions to the system 4 4). This is by
no means the end of the review and classification task, however.
On the contrary, there lies ahead a task more formidable than
what has gone before: the review process now shifts from formally classified primitive areas to unclassified and heretofore unstudied roadless areas within the national forests.
The Wilderness Act mandated an evaluation of national forest lands which are within or contiguous to existing primitive areas. Thus, the principal thrust of the classification process so far as the Forest Service is concerned is to review its own
prior classifications. In addition, however, the Act permitsbut does not specifically mandate-review of other roadless areas
outside of (and not necessarily contiguous to) existing primitive areas. In 1967, the Forest Service undertook an inventory
program for such roadless areas to determine their suitability for
inclusion in the Wilderness System.45 Regional foresters were
44. A status report as of July, 1973, indicates that a total of 11 million acres was in wilderness status; the three agencies had proposed the
addition of 9.3 million acres, but this proposal was awaiting congressional
action.

See FOREST SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, FnAL ENVIRONSTATEMENT ON RoADLESS AN-D UNDEVELOPED AREAs 10 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT]. Final admin-

MENTAL

istrative action on some 2.9 million acres of primitive areas was at that
time uncompleted, as was final action on the vast bulk of Interior lands
(over 50 million acres) to be studied. It is doubtful, however, that much
of this park and refuge land will be found appropriate for preservation.
45. The basis on which the Forest Service undertook this inventory
was the Multiple-Use and Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§ 52831 (1970), which, of course, recognizes wilderness as a use of the national
forests. Presumably the reason for basing the inventory on the 1960 Act
rather than the Wilderness Act was that the Service believed it would
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directed to inventory all roadless areas of 5000 or more acres and
select those warranting future study as to possible wilderness
classification. This inventory was the product of mixed motivation. Part of the initiative came from the preservationists.
Aware of vast acreage of roadless forest lands outside the existing primitive areas, national parks, or wildlife refuges, the presservationists wanted to insure that such lands would not be frozen out of the Wilderness System. The strength of their interest
is understandable once it is noted that these national forest
roadless lands of 5000 acres or more comprise a total area which
is more than three times the size of the total existing Wilderness
System. While national forest lands in wilderness or primitive
classification total some 15 million acres, the additional roadless areas comprise an area of approximately 56 million acres. 4 6
However, demands by preservationists, who received a hearing
at the White House before the order to study these areas, were
not the lone motive for undertaking this inventory. Although
the Forest Service did not favor expansion of the wilderness
areas, it had a strong interest in knowing what it was, or
would be, confronted with in the way of demand for the particular land use. In order to facilitate resource planning, and in particular planning for timber and recreation, it was essential to
know what lands might become wilderness-the "maximum universe" of lands suitable for wilderness classification. The problem of information was made more acute by virtue of the fact
that, as the primitive area review program progressed, numerous
demands were being made to Congress to preserve individual
areas outside existing primitive areas.. Since the lands lay outside the primitive areas being studied, the Forest Service was hard
pressed to respond to these demands in the absence of some systematic inventory. The continued addition of such individual
areas not only impeded its management planning, but also
threatened to take initiative and control over wilderness classification away from the Service and subject it to the "caprice" of
local interests and pressures.
However, despite these incentives to produce a comprehensive inventory as soon as possible, little effort was made by most
have greater flexibility under the former. A detailed account of the
roadless area review program is contained in the pleadings and statements filed in Sierra Club v. Butz, Civil No. 1223-72 (D.D.C. 1972). For
most of the following chronicle I have relied on the Statement of Material Facts As To Which There Is No Genuine Issue filed in that case.
An outline of the review process is also contained in the FnxAL EzvmowMFMAL STATEvmNT, supra note 44, at 14-77.
46. FnAL ENvnIoN
rrA STATEmENT, supra note 44, at 15.
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of the regions to complete the inventory. The Washington office made equally little effort to press them until 1971, one year
before the deadline set for the completion of the inventory (not
the completion of the study). In 1971, the Chief issued new directives to the regions to complete the inventory in accordance
with new specified procedures and to report their recommendations for areas to ,be designated as New Study Areas by 1972.
The reports, submitted in June, 1972, recommended only about
10.7 million of the qualifying 56 million acres of roadless areas
for further study .by the regional foresters. The recommendations were in the main adopted and incorporated in a draft environmental impact statement in January, 1973.47 After further
review and after public response to the draft impact statement,
the selection was revised with the result that over a million
more acres were added. The final list encompasses some 12.3
48
million acres.
The initial selection of some 10.7 million acres by the Forest
Service evoked outrage from the Sierra Club and other preservationist groups, who proceeded to bring a suit challenging the
adequacy of the selection process. The suit itself was withdrawn
when the Service agreed to issue an environmental impact statement before any of the roadless areas not selected for further
study were subjected to uses incompatible with wilderness. 49
The consequences of this agreement remain to be seen; we will
return to this after examining the processes of classification and
the primitive area review progrant.0
47. FOREST SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, DRAFT ENVmONmYENTAL STATEMENT ON ROADLEsS AREAs (1973) [hereinafter cited as DRAr
ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMNT].
48. See FINAL ENVo

NAL STATEMEN, supra note 44, at 14-77.
This figure includes some areas that had been previously recommended
for further study independent of the 1971 directive.
49. See Sierra Club v. Butz, Civil No. 1223-2 (D.D.C. 1972). The
suit was later withdrawn after being transferred to San Francisco. Wall
St. J., Dec. 4, 1972, at 8, col. 3.
50. On the basic procedures and standards of the Forest Service for
review and classification, see FoREsT SRVIcE MANUAL § 2320 [hereinafter
cited as FSM] and FoREsT Svc
HiANDBOOK § 2309.13. My discussion
also draws on study reports of individual wilderness areas and discussions with Forest Service officials, as well as other identified sources. Interior Department procedures and standards for classification, while
much less clearly stated, can be found in U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Secretarial Order No. 2920, Jan. 20, 1969, and in U.S. Dep't of the Interior,
Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and
Parks to the Directors of the National Park Service and the Bureau of
Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, Guidelines for Wilderness Proposals, Jan.
24, 1972.
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The classification procedure used to decide which areas are
to be recommended to Congress for inclusion in the Wilderness
System has been clearly stated only by the Forest Service. Since
the Wilderness Act states that 'both formally classified primitive
areas and contiguous multiple-use lands of predominant value as
wilderness may be admitted to the System, Forest Service
procedures provide that, before a detailed analysis of resource
values is made, a general study area including 'both primitive
areas and potential contiguous wildernesses shall be chosen. Once
the general area to be studied is defined, it is surveyed and
evaluated according to three primary standards: suitability,
availability, and need.51
The suitability test

52

measures the qualities of the area

against the definition of wilderness given in the Act-not a very
precise formulation. The pristine character of the land and its
natural protection against man-made interferences are most important; these are also the points on which most of the major
controversies between the Forest Service and preservationists
have centered. The Forest Service has been reluctant to include
in the System any land into which there has been substantial intrusion by man, even though the physical evidence of man's activities has been, or will be, erased by natural process. The traditional rationale for this has been that the inclusion of such
lands not only is itself inconsistent with the wilderness ideal,
but also will provide a precedent for permitting on-going activities inconsistent with wilderness preservation. 53 Forest Service
policy in this respect differs from that of the Park Service,
which has been less "purist" in its approach to the problem of
51. The Department of the Interior does not use these standards.
Rather, each area is considered separately, with special attention given
to its unique character. Memorandum, supra note 50, at 1. General criteria of availability and suitability are mentioned as factors in this individual determination, however. See notes 52, 57, infra.

52. See FSM, supra note 50, §§ 2314.36 (c) (5), 2321.11. The Depart-

ment of the Interior, while considering suitability when developing wilderness proposals, does not place nearly so heavy an emphasis upon it
as does the Forest Service. For example, the Interior's guidelines for
wilderness proposals state:
An area should not be excluded from wilderness designation

solely because established or proposed management practices require the use of tools, equipment or structures, if these practices
are necessary for the health and safety of wilderness travelers,
or the protection of the wilderness area.
Memorandum, supra note 50, at 1. Similarly, the presence of visitor-use

structures and facilities, roads, or utility lines will not preclude an area
from being proposed for wilderness classification. Id. at 2.
53. See, e.g., Cliff, The Wilderness Act and the National Forests, in
WiLDums Am THE quATY oF I=w 9 (1969),
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man-made intrusions. 54 The Forest Service approach has been
bitterly attacked as a thinly veiled attempt to restrict wilderness
preservation. 55 Although it is that in part, there is more to the
matter than this somewhat simplistic criticism suggests. There
is also more to it than the Forest Service's defense implies.
Just as the Forest Service has sought to exclude lands showing evidence-however faint-of significant past use, so also has
it sought to exclude lands without natural barriers adequate to
protect them against encroachments by intensive uses from adjacent lands or :by more distant influences that would disrupt the
"wilderness experience" with the "sights and sounds of civilization." 56 Here it is evident that the Forest Service is much more
deeply, and understandably, concerned about the difficulty of
preserving wilderness values, since the impact of established
commercial or intensive recreational uses is all but impossible to
guard against by administrative fiat.
Once an area has passed the suitability test, an assessment
of its social utility as wilderness is made under the criteria of
"availability" and "need." 7 To translate from one jargon into
another, "availability" is essentially the "opportunity cost" of
wilderness, the value of all of the resources which are removed
from active use or management. 58 The "need" criterion is, essen54. See, e.g., NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,
ADMINISTRATIVE PoLIcIEs FOR NATURAL ARmAs OF =u NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM

40 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
55.

See, e.g., Wm

ADmImISTRATIVE POLiCIES].

-ERNssREPORT, Nov. 1972, at 5.

56. See, e.g., Hearings on San Gabriel, Washakie & Mount Jefferson
Wilderness Areas Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands of the Senate
Interior and Insular Affairs Comm., 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1968)
(statement of the Chief of the Forest Service). This consideration was
one of the reasons for the Service's insistence, prior to the Act, that wilderness areas be large. Size is still an important consideration, both under the Act (5,000 acres or "sufficient size as to make practicable its preservation and use in an unimpaired condition," 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c)
(1970)) and in Forest Service policy. Despite pressures to add small
parcels of land here and there, of the areas recommended by the Service
through 1973, there were included only three under 35,000 acres. NnH
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 38, at Appendix III.
57. FSM, supra note 50, § 2321.12-.13.

The Department of the In-

terior also recognizes availability as a criterion for its decisions on classification, stating:
Those areas which presently qualify for wilderness designation
but will be needed at some future date for specific purposes consistent with the purpose for which the [area] was originally
created, and fully described in an approved conceptual plan,
should not be proposed for wilderness designation ....
Memorandum, supra note 50, at 2-3. "Need" is not mentioned by the
Department as a decision criterion.
58. FSM, supra note 50, § 2321.12 lists the following examples of
"unavailable" lands:
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tially, the benefit side of the benefit-cost equation. Insofar as
it is anything more than the expression of a willingness to classify all "suitable" and "available" lands as wilderness, a determination of "need" theoretically considers the demand for wilderness in the particular area encountered. Such an assessment
takes into account the amount of wilderness land already set
aside in a particular location, the population of the area, and
other factors pertinent to prospective use, including whether
other nonwilderness lands can satisfy the demand. In theory,
the determination of "need" also considers the quality of the area
in question and its ability to provide "wilderness experience"the latter supposedly being influenced by the scenic quality of
isolation and the variety of experiences available in the area.
I have pointedly noted that the components of need are theoretical, for it is not apparent whether such determinations
have had much impact to date. Indeed, even the "availability"
criterion, which would seem to lie at the heart of the basic
preservation decision, has not played much of a role in the review of primitive areas. A 'basic political commitment having
been made to recommend most of the land in primitive areas for
inclusion in the Wilderness System, the primary use of these economic considerations has been in adjusting boundaries here and
there and in excluding particular areas where valuable timber is
present. At times, they have even resulted in a refusal to study
areas where timber contracts existed.59 Even in those cases
where some economic appraisal has been made, it has been more
the product of thumbnail estimates than of a careful cost analysis. In recent years, however, attention to more sophisticated
benefit-cost analysis has become evident, first in recent studies of
1. Areas where the need for increased water protection and
on-site storage is so vital that the installation or maintenance
of works and facilities incompatible with wilderness is an obvious and inevitable public necessity.
2. Areas where wilderness classification would seriously
restrict . . .the application of wildlife management measures of
considerable urgency and importance.
3. Highly mineralized areas which ... clearly show economic mining potential of such an extent that restrictions necessary to maintain the wilderness character of the land would not
be in the public interest.
4. National forest areas supporting heavy stands of high
quality timber, all of which is essential to the economic welfare
of existing dependent communities.
5. Areas containing natural phenomena of such unique or
outstanding nature that general public access should be provided.
59. See Parker v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 593 (D. Colo. 1970),
aff'd, 448 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1972).
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a few primitive areas 60 and then in the preliminary survey of
New Study Areas.6 1
When an area has been found suitable for classification as
wilderness, the agency proposal is given to the President, who
transmits it to Congress. The Wilderness Act provides that prior
to submitting recommendations to the President regarding the
preservation of any area as wilderness, public notice is given
and hearings held. In addition, the general public as well as
federal, state, and local officials concerned with the area are specifically invited to submit their views.
After an evaluation of the views submitted, the proposal is
reviewed and modifications-usually minor-are made as warranted. The revised proposal then provides the basis for preparation of a draft environmental impact statement. This draft
statement is circulated, as required ,by the National Environmen.
tal Policy Act, 62 for a second review by public agencies and the
public.63 When their response has been received, a regional fores60. The Idaho Primitive Area, one of the largest and most controversial areas, is an example; I am told by Forest Service officials that a
full benefit-cost analysis was undertaken there.
61. See FNAL ENvmoNiVNTAL STATEmENT, supra note 44, at 25-46.
The analysis reflected in this impact statement is noteworthy not only
for its detailed quantification of opportunity cost, but also for its attempt
(not totally successful) to reflect some measure of benefit ("need"). The
latter was measured by calculating the quality of each area, as rated by
the regional forester, who evaluated scenic value, isolation, and variety
of experience, and multiplying that by the size of the area to arrive at
an "effectiveness" index. Cost was measured by two indices: first, the
value of timber foregone; second, the value of all resources-minerals,
recreation, and timber, together with the costs of establishment and administration. Comparison of these then provided the primary basis for
dividing roadless areas into those with the highest and lowest potential
for inclusion and for selecting 235 areas for final identification and temporary protection (pending final study) as New Study Areas. Subsequent data corrections and response to public input then produced a net
increase of 39 areas, for a total of 274. Id. at 46-64
62. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970).
63. The requirements of the Wilderness Act are more specific in regard to public participation than those of the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA), but interpretive rulings of the latter have made the
public participation process which it requires essentially similar to that
of the former. NEPA requires that the comments of other federal agencies be solicited for major actions having a significant impact on the environment. Under NEPA, notice to the public is mandated in accordance
with the procedures of the applicable portion of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970) (the Freedom of Information Act).
While NEPA does not itself mandate public hearings, or even the affirmative solicitation of public views, Executive Order No. 11,514, 3 C.F.R. 271
(19741) and Guidelines promulgated by the Council o Environmental
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ter compiles a final report-a revision of the draft environmental

statement-making adjustments in accordance with the evidence
gathered at hearings and the other information which has become available since the initial proposal. After approval iby the
Washington office, the final environmental impact statement is
forwarded to the President for approval and thence to Congress. To date all but one of the recommendations of the Forest
Service have been endorsed -bythe President.6 4
IV. WILDERNESS CLASSIFICATION:
THE POLICY ISSUES

A. Sol= PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS
The Wilderness Act of 1964 settled (at least for a time) the
question whether wilderness lands ought to be permanently preserved. However, by the time the Act was passed, that question
had ceased to be an important element of the controversy over
wilderness. Notwithstanding the fears of preservationists to the
contrary, the Forest Service appears to have committed itself to
some permanent preservation prior to 1960, and after that date
to have accepted the concept of a statutory system. The timber
and mining industries may not have warmly endorsed the preservationist ideal, but even among their ranks public opposition
to any wilderness preservation became increasingly infrequent
in the course of the debates over the Wilderness Act. The true
dispute centered around the questions of how much wilderness
and on what conditions. As to the former, since the Act directly protected all of the then existing "wilderness" land (some
9.1 million acres), a large portion of the lands then identified as
suitable for wilderness was removed from dispute. What remained were the national forest primitive areas and unidentified
areas within the national parks and wildlife refuges. Now that
the survey of lands contemplated by the Act is largely completed, the advantages of hindsight are available, and in that
specially favored position it seems somewhat curious that so
Quality require an agency to obtain public views. For current CEQ
Guidelines on public participation see 38 Fed. Reg. 20554, 20555 (1973)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1500.9). In some cases a full, formal
hearing has been mandated by the courts. See, e.g., Hanley v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
64. The High Uintas recommendation is the lone exception of which
I am aware; endorsement was withheld pending further examination of
a conflict with the Central Utah Water Project. See U.S. DEP'T or AGoicuLTURE & U.S. DEP'T oF THm I

oR, FIm ANNUAL REPORT ON THE

STATUS Or THE NATIONAL WiLDERNESS PRESERVATION SYSTBM, H.R. Doc. No.

58, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 5 (1969).
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much controversy was generated over what now appear to be
relativeZy small areas. Moreover, at least by the time the review
was half completed it should have been apparent that most of the
national forest primitive areas, and more, would ultimately be
recommended for inclusion."5 Politically, the Forest Service had

little choice but to recommend inclusion of almost all of this acreage. After all, most of the primitive land had already been recognized as at least primafacie suitable for wilderness-the primitive classification itself established that. That these lands had
not heretofore been elevated to permanent wilderness status
does perhaps suggest that they had not 'been the foremost candidates for protection. As a practical matter, however, under the
1964 mandate of Congress, the Forest Service could scarcely
have been so cautious as it had been before. The primitive lands
were generally "available" for wilderness, and most have little
other practicable use. Much of the land is fragile and unproductive. Timber is of little value, at least in relation to the cost of
access. Mineral value is not fully known, but in many areas it
is plain that such value would not justify the cost of access and
extraction.
Yet for all this seeming unimportance, the debate over the
inclusion or exclusion of particular areas has been vigorous and
sometimes vitriolic. The explanations, I think, are two; both
shed important light on the character of the overall controversy. The first and most obvious explanation for the strident
character of the debate over reclassification of primitive areas is
that each particular occasion giving rise to contention between
preservationists and "multiple-use" advocates is quickly escalated
into a grand debate over wilderness versus nonwilderness values.
This in turn becomes an even more wide-ranging debate over the
character of modern civilization. For some preservationists,
each battle is but a part of a larger "holy war" and has a symbolic significance far beyond any measurable objective. So too
for some of the opposition. Each side is looking not only at immediate gains and losses, but also toward future casualties in battles yet to be fought. However, it is not merely this larger strug.
gle over ideology that is involved in the explanation. Seei in
the perspective of a total system of, for example, 15 million
acres, the inclusion or exclusion of 50,000 acres here or there does
65. As of the end of 1973, the Forest Service had recommended for
permanent preservation a total area 13 percent greater than the area contained within the present boundaries of those primitive areas reviewed.
Nnsnu ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 38, at Appendix HI.
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not seem like much to quarrel over, except in symbolic terms;
but from a local perspective it may be exceedingly important.
Noninclusion of 50,000 acres may not reduce by much the overall
extent of the Wilderness System (particularly since, as it has
turned out, all deletions have been more than offset by new additions), but that is small comfort to local preservationists who
want their own wilderness area. On the other hand, to take commercial timber as an example, preservation of an area will have
a negligible effect on the national timber supply no matter how
richly endowed; but it could have enormous impact on local
60
mills.
Both of these phenomena-the holy war aspect and localism
-have had and will continue to have important consequences for
wilderness preservation. The former suggests the difficulty of
using objective measures to define wilderness or to determine
the extent to which it should be preserved. This is already evident in the opposition of many preservationists to the use of an
economic approach in evaluating the costs of wilderness. The
latter phenomenon compounds the difficulties of decision insofar
as it impedes political settlement through trade-offs on a national basis. From a national perspective it is chiefly the overall
size and, to a lesser extent, the quality of the wilderness lands
that is important-the exclusion of one small area can -be offset
by the inclusion of another. But insofar as local interests on
both sides must be consulted and considered, such trade-offs between, for example, the national Sierra Club on one side and the
National Forest Products Association on the other, are not possible. Therefore, there is really little choice but to perform an
exhaustive and exhausting area-by-area review. That is what
has been done with the primitive areas; that is what will have
to be done with other roadless areas.

B. DEFINING WILDERNESs
The first question that emerges in controversies over wilderness is what is meant by that term. The Forest Service, as
noted above, characterizes the concept in terms of suitability of
land for wilderness, which suggests practical considerations independent of the abstract question of defining wilderness. But
virtually all of the practical considerations refer back to the underlying abstraction.
66. See, e.g., DAvis et at., supra note 16, at 32-37, for a discussion
of the local impact of preservation in the Monongahela National Forest
in West Virginia.
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The search for an acceptable answer to this question has
proven to be one of the most intractable problems in forest resource management. The core of the difficulty lies in the fact
that wilderness is not merely a condition of the land, but also a
condition of the mind which is evoked by the land. At the
very least a definition based on this latter condition is likely to
vary a great deal with individualized experience and taste.
Even Thoreau, the guru of modern preservationists ("in wilderness is the preservation of the world"), seems to have been of
two minds on the matter. From pastoral Walden Pond he wrote
wonderful words about la vie naturale,but the slope of a mountain in a real wilderness caused him considerable discomfiture:
he found it "savage and dreary"--a "place for heathenism and
superstitious rites. '67 Thus it is not surprising that those whose
nearest forest is Central Park may see wilderness as any place
without dogs and mounted -police.68 Plainly, something more
was contemplated by Congress. Even by the loosest standards,
Central Park is not a wilderness (a jungle perhaps, but not a
wilderness).
What has emerged, therefore, from attempts to articulate
the meaning of wilderness has tended to be the stuff of poetry-not the best guide for the land-use planner. The Wilderness Act, in a burst of eloquence rare for Congress, declares
wilderness to be an area "where the earth and its community of
life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor
who does not remain." 69 That is not helpful. The Act, how67. Quoted in NASH, supra note 3, at 91.
68. Noteworthy in this regard is a survey by researchers in the Department of Sociology at the University of Minnesota of campers returning from wilderness trips. The following is a list of conveniences they
desired to have in the wilderness:
Conveniences:
Percent of interviewees
desiring conveniences
More campsites
82
First-aid stations
52
Garbage disposal places
79
Toilets
78
Picnic tables
60
Fireplaces
54
Wells for drinking water
72
Places to buy groceries
49

Public telephones

21

Planned recreation
16
Showers and washrooms
15
Electricity
12
Hearings on the Wilderness PreservationSystem Before the Subcomm.
on Public Lands of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs,
87th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 12, at 311 (1961) (statement of E.C. Cleveland).
69. 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (c) (1970).
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ever, is not wholly without practical guidelines. It instructs us
that the area must be "without permanent improvements or human habitation"; that it must appear "to have been affected
primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man's
work substantially unnoticeable"; that the area should offer
"outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of recreation"; and, finally, that it must be at
least 5000 acres or "of sufficient size as to make practicable its
preservation. 7 0° These are minimal guidelines, and as a practical matter they simply pass on the task of definition to the further working of the administrative (and political) process.
The absence of clearer guidelines from Congress has permitted debate over an extreme range of alternatives-generally
with the Forest Service at one pole and the Sierra Club and Wilderness Society at the other. The Forest Service, as mentioned
earlier, has rather doggedly insisted on a purist definition of
wilderness. It has been very reluctant to include in its recommendations lands where timber has been cut or roads and other
still-visible structures built. Parker v. United States1 offers
one instructive example of this attitude, and the prolonged controversy over "Wilderness East" another.
Parkerwas a suit to enjoin a timber sale in a portion of an
area contiguous to the Gore Range-Eagles Nest Primitive Area
in Colorado's White Mountain National Forest. Plaintiffs contended that a timber sale in the area would in effect preclude
any future consideration of the area for wilderness. Their basic
contention was that once an area had been determined to be
"suitable" for wilderness, the Forest Service could not take any
action which would impair that suitability until the President
had had the opportunity to determine whether or not to propose the area for inclusion within the Wilderness System. The
Forest Service contended that the area was neither "available"
-because it had long been planned to harvest timber in the
area-nor "suitable"--because of the presence of a small "bug
road," built in the early 1950's to provide access for fighting
the bark beetle. The trial court found for the plaintiffs and enjoined the sale. The decision, upheld on appeal, was enthusiastically acclaimed -by preservationists and roundly criticized by
the Forest Service and the timber industry.
70. Id.
71. 309 F. Supp. 593 (D. Colo. 1970), a-fd, 448 F.2d 79$ (10th1 Cir.
1971), cert, denied, 405 ",.S, 989 (1972),
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The opinion makes two noteworthy holdings. First, it held
that the agency's determination that the area was not "available"
was of no consequence. Under the court's interpretation, the
Act precludes the Service from cutting in any area contiguous to
a primitive or wilderness area if the contiguous area is "predominantly wilderness in character."7 2 While the Service's reconmendations to the President for permanent disposition can
take such matters as cost and benefit into account, if it is determined that the area is "suitable" for wilderness, the agency must
stay its hand until the President has acted. The full implications of this part of the decision are potentially broad; it is the
second part of the opinion which is of interest here, however.
The court's finding that the area was suitable for wilderness
gave short shrift to the "purist" argument of the government
that the presence of the road precluded such a determination.
The court observed that the road had been blocked off, was
partially overgrown, and because of the dense growth around it
was not visible from more than 100 yards away.7 3 Moreover,
the boundaries of the area could be drawn to exclude it.
At first glance, the court's opinion on this point seems sensible. In fact, it was not challenged by the government on appeal.7 4

Why should the status of the entire area turn on the

72. 309 F. Supp. at 601.
73. The plaintiff's proposal for the wilderness area was to draw the
boundaries in such a way as to exclude the road. This was not such
a unique idea. The boundaries of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area
(BWCA) in Northern Minnesota have been very greatly "gerrymandered" to exclude nonconforming roads as well as some private land
holdings. The Forest Service, however, has always insisted that the
BWCA is a unique area which does not fully conform to the standards
prescribed for other areas and which is not managed the same as the
others. For example, timber harvesting has been permitted under the
Shipstead-Nolan Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 577-577b (1970); see also sections
4(a)(2) and 4(d)(5) of the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1134(a) (2),
(d)(5) (1970). However, a recent decision preliminarily enjoined certain timber harvesting activities in the BWCA until a final determination
by the court of the plaintiff's challenge to the adequacy of an environmental impact statement on, inter alia, these activities and of the plaintiff's claim that logging in the BWCA is inconsistent with the concept
of wilderness preservation and accordingly prohibited by the provisions
of the Wilderness Act. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v.
Butz, No. 4-72-Civil-598 (D. Minn., Sept. 18, 1974). See also Minnesota
Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584 (D. Minn. 1973),
affd, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974) (injunction prohibiting certain logging
activities in BWCA issued, under National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970), until completion of an environmental impact statement by the Forest Service). This decision suggests that
the BWCA may be treated as a full-fledged wilderness, in which case
it might be used, wisely or unwisely, as a model for other areas.
74. The government's main challenge on appeal was to the first
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presence of one small "bug road" that would ultimately disappear? On second thought, however, this "sensible" answer raises
some difficult questions. If an "invisible" bug road does not disqualify an area from protection as wilderness, what about a
road once used for logging, still visible because of use by hunters in jeeps? 70 After all, these roads too will eventually disappear naturally, and they can be made to disappear more rapidly
78
by administrative action.
Parker represents one relatively trivial illustration of the
purist position taken -by the Forest Service. Although the Service was overruled in that particular instance, it has continued
to insist on a rather high standard of suitability. This insistence is illustrated by the "Wilderness East" controversy. Statutorily protected wilderness is unevenly distributed; virtually
all of it is located in the eleven western states and Alaska.
Apart from the unique Boundary Waters Canoe Area in Minnesota, the amount of wilderness in the East is negligible. This
is the case for two reasons. First, there is a relatively small
amount of federal land holdings in the East.7 7 Second, most fedholding of the court, the one that was clearly seen by the agency as the
most important. 448 F.2d at 796.
75. See Hearings on San Gabriel, Washakie & Mount Jefferson Wilderness Areas, supra note 56, at 17.
76. In fact, the Forest Service has sometimes eliminated such evidence of man's intrusions, occasionally to the discomfiture of those who
use the area. A well-known example of this occurred when the Forest
Service was directed by Congress (at the insistence of local preservationists) to include Marion Lake within the Mount Jefferson Wilderness
Area in Oregon. The Service had opposed the inclusion because of the
heavy use of the lake and the surrounding area and of the existence of
various man-made improvements. After the area was included, the Forest Service removed certain facilities such as picnic tables, fireplaces,
water pumps, and a boathouse along the lakeshore. This provoked criticism that the agency was simply trying to get back at Congress and its
local supporters. See Hearings on S. 316 and Related Bills (Eastern Wilderness Areas) Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands of the Senate
Comm. on Interiorand Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1973).
The National Park Service, on the other hand, accepts as a "fundamental tenet" of park management policy the idea that wilderness areas
within the national parks can be restored by the removal of adverse uses.
ADwrisnTvnmE PoLIcIEs, supra note 54 at 40. For example, the Park
Service cites the case of Sequoia National Park, which in 1893 was so
overgrazed by sheep that it was very close to permanent destruction. The
acting superintendent of the park at that time recommended that the
cavalry troops stationed there be replaced by infantry, since no natural
forage was available for horses. Today, however, the park contains "wilderness comparable to any other national park." Id. at 40-41.
77. Over 90 percent of federal lands outside Alaska are located in
the eleven westernmost states.
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eral lands in the East were acquired after they had been heavily
used-indeed, it was just such overuse that led to their acquisition by the Forest Service. Such areas have been denied statutory protection, however, by the Service's purity standard of
suitability; after passage of the Wilderness Act and the initial
inclusion of a few small Eastern wilderness areas in the Wilderness System, the Service declared, "there are simply no suitable
remaining candidate areas for wilderness classification in [the
Eastern] part of the national forest system."7 8 Since that time,
only a few proposals have been made toCongress for inclusion of
Eastern areas in the Wilderness System, and these have concerned only small wildlife refuges. 7 9 No Eastern national forest
areas have been added. At the same time, however, the demand for wilderness in the East is high. The greater population density, the concrete and steel pressures of modern society,
and the inaccessibility of western wilderness areas are only
some of the factors that contribute to this demand.
In recent years, this conflict resulted in two proposals:
one to establish a special class of near-wilderness lands; the other
to add some 28 areas (a total of 471,000 acres) to the existing
wilderness system. Under the former, Congress would have created a system of "wild areas." These were defined as primitive
areas where, although man might have "left his mark," the imprint of human activity was slight enough to allow restoration
of the areas to a natural state. The protection that would have
been extended to these areas was similar but not identical to
that given wilderness areas: timber harvesting and grazing
would have been banned; all new mining activity would have
been prohibited; the use of motor vehicles and equipment would
have been restricted; and only public facilities of a "rustic, primitive nature" would have been permitted.8 0 The rationale for
such a separate wild-areas system was that of maintaining the
sanctity of wilderness areas; indeed the proposal was really a
reflection of the well-known position of the Forest Service on
78. Quoted in Hearings on S. 316 and Related Bills, supra note 76,

at 19,46 (statements of Sen. Hechler and the Wilderness Society).

79. There have been only 12 Eastern areas totaling less than 35,000
acres added to the Wilderness System since the passage of the Act; all
of them are national wildlife refuges. There are no Eastern national forest proposals and only five Eastern national park proposals, encompassing approximately 287,000 acres, currently before Congress. NiNir
AmwArL REPoRT,supra note 38.
80. See generally Hearings on S. 3699 and Related Bills Before the
Subcomm. on Environment, Soil Conservation & Forestry of the Senate
Comm, on Agricultureand FQrestry 92d Cong., 2d $eqs. (1972).
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purity. Most of the Eastern areas proposed for wild-area status
(which were essentially the same ones proposed by others for
inclusion in the Wilderness System) were less than 5000 acres
81
or showed visible signs of man's influence.
Most preservationists opposed the wild-areas proposal because, they contended, it was a subterfuge to limit true wilderness by giving legislative sanction to the restrictive notions of
purity advanced by the Forest Service.8 2 They argued that the
proposed wild areas qualified for full wilderness protection, and
they accordingly supported alternative legislation that would
have effected this protection by designating some 28 areas as part
of the Wilderness System. One bill8 3 would also have amended
the Wilderness Act specifically to permit the inclusion of areas
where the evidence of man's presence had been substantially
erased and the area "restored" to wilderness. This proposal
would thus have permitted certain nonconforming uses or improvements to be present at the time the area was designated
a "wilderness," the assumption having been that they would be
removed.
Recently, the Senate passed a compromise bill which incorporates elements from each of these two proposals.8 4 Nineteen
Eastern areas would be added to the Wilderness System immediately upon passage of the bill, and 40 additional Eastern areas
would be designated for further study. Management of the new
Eastern wilderness areas, however, would incorporate certain
special protections reminiscent of those formerly advocated for
"wild areas": the lands (both Eastern wilderness and study
areas) would be immediately withdrawn from all forms of appropriation under the mining laws, grazing on wilderness land
81. At least one conservation group-the Izaak Walton League-has
supported the wild areas proposal on the assumption that in time these
areas will develop into wilderness. Id. at 19-20. Others have doubted
that this development will ever occur under Forest Service management.
Id. at 71. Another argument advanced in favor of the concept is that
wild areas will sustain greater recreational use than wilderness. Id. at
35. However, that argument seems to run counter to the intent of many
of the bills, which would expressly restrict public use to a level consistent with the retention of the areas' primitive characteristics.
82. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 14392 and Related Bills Before the
Subcomm. on Forests of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 46, 57, 122, 136 (1972) (comments of the Sierra Club, Wilderness
Society, and Friends of the Earth).
83. S. 316, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1973, introduced by Senator Jackson.
See Hearingson S. 316 and Related Bills, supra note 76.
84. S. 3433, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). See generally 120 CoNG.
ltxc, S 9383-99 (daily ed, May 31, 1974),
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in the East would be by permit only, and new water or power
projects would be banned on new lands protected as Eastern
wilderness. Unlike the wild-areas bill, there is no provision allowing primitive public facilities, and, in fact, the new bill clearly
provides that except as otherwise mentioned the new Eastern
wilderness areas would be managed under the same standards
as existing components of the Wilderness System. Thus, timber
harvesting and the use of motorized vehicles and equipment
would be prohibited in new Eastern wilderness areas to the same
extent as in other components of the Wilderness System.
For quite some time, the Forest Service kept a discreet silence
in public concerning these various proposals, although in fact it
was widely known that it favored the wild-areas proposal. In
the face of vocal criticism from preservationists, however, the
Forest Service eventually threw its support behind a third proposal submitted by the Administration to add to the existing System certain Eastern lands which had been "restored" to a wilderness state. This support has been carefully limited to Eastern
(east of the 100th meridian) lands only,85 and, unlike the bill
recently passed by the Senate, the Administration's alternative
would require an amendment of the Wilderness Act changing the
definition of wilderness to expressly allow inclusion of Eastern
areas showing the imprint of man.8 6
Thus, the endorsement of a "Wilderness East" proposal by
the Forest Service represents only a small step back from its purity policy; apart from this compromise, the Forest Service has
continued to embrace the purity ideal and to insist that purity,
like virginity, cannot be restored. The traditional argument for
this position has been that the same standards which govern
protection of wilderness (after it is classified as such) should
govern the initial selection process. Otherwise the high level of
protection against demands for nonconforming uses cannot be
maintained. A former Chief of the Forest Service, Edward Cliff,
explained:
Personally I hope very much that we will not see a lowering
of quality standards to make acceptable some manmade intrusions or defects of other kinds simply for the sake of adding
acreage. If this is done, we will surely see an undermining of
our defense against similar intrusions on lands already in the
system.... Quality standards may be eroded and significantly
lowered in the future unless we keep our sights high.... The
quality we insist on in classification will shape the character and
85. Hearings on S. 316 and Related Bills, supra note 76, at 21-22.
86. Id. See also S. 938, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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quality of the environment 8that
can be maintained in future
7
management of the resources.
Preservationists have attacked this rationale as inconsistent
with the more flexible standard of the Act, which says that
the imprint of man's work need only be "substantially unnoticeable". The Service's argument is, they contend, only an excuse
for opposing expansion of the Wilderness System.88 While this
view seems extreme, the agency's rationale does appear more restrictive than the Act commands and also a bit disingenuous, or
at least incomplete, in not elaborating a deeper reason for its
conservative approach. Contrary to the belief of the preservationists, however, there are practical reasons for high standards.
First, there is the problem of maintaining standards of preservation once an area is identified as wilderness. Clearly this problem is related somewhat to the character of the initial classification. If land bearing visible signs of man's intrusions is included in the wilderness, it will be more difficult to preclude future nonconforming uses of that land. It is doubtful that the
problem is a major one, however, since it appears the difficulties the Service has faced in this respect are only slightly related to whether the land was once "trammeled" 'by man. The
major problem of administration existing today principally
stems from the pressures of large numbers of users and demands
for incompatible uses, such as motorized equipment; the magnitude of both generally has little to do with how pristine the land
was when it was first designated a statutory wilderness. 89 There
87. Cliff, supra note 53, at 9. See also Costley, An Enduring Resource, 78 Am. FoRSTS, June, 1972, at 8 (Costley was head of the Recreation Division under Cliff and one of the modern architects of the Service's
wilderness policy).
88. See, e.g., WmDEms-S REPORT, supra note 55, at 5: "No
agency policy is more clearly misconceived, nor more deliberate an effort
to frustrate the Wilderness Act."
89. This requires some qualification. Where the area is still extensively used, the problem can be significant, as the Marion Lake example,
cited in note 76, supra, illustrates. The problem typically is not that the
offending man-made improvements cannot be removed, it is that the improvements may be necessary to prevent hordes of recreation users from
damaging the area. For example, an outdoor privy can be removed, but
where a large number of visitors use the area, removal of all privies can
only lead to toilet paper being strewn randomly around the forests, not
to mention possible pollution of the local water supply. Fire grates or
rudimentary campgrounds present a similar problem. To the person
who seeks pure wilderness, a fire grate or a cleared campground may
be an unwelcome reminder that he is still within the frontier of man's
dominion. But these are not conveniences for the visitor; they are intended to limit the risk of "nonnatural" fires. At some point, however,
the density of use becomes so great that it is impossible to protect
the area without significantly altering the wilderness character. That,
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is, however, a more significant reason for maintaining high
standards. High standards of purity do not, as the preservationists claim, represent a simple opposition to wilderness expansion, but rather a method of drawing a desirable limit to preservation. For many preservationists, the fact that an area may
have been subjected to use in the past is a matter of relatively
little concern, provided the natural condition and appearance
has been or can soon be restored. There is some practical appeal
to this; once the condition of the land is restored, who will know
whether at some time in the "distant" past (as we now gauge
time, a matter of a score of years or so) part of the land was
roaded, logged, or explored by miners? To paraphrase the Lady
Clairol advertisement, only the Forest Service will know for sure.
And who will care? To the extent people are responding to the
area as it is now, past use is unlikely to be of much consequence
to most of them.
The difficulty is that such a flexible approach leaves too few
limits on preservation. If any land can become wilderness
through either natural or artificial restoration to a primitive
condition, the potential expanse of wilderness becomes not only
great, but greatly elastic. What former Chief Cliff ought to have
said was not that we should keep the standards restrictive in
order to keep them high, but rather that we should keep them
high in order to keep them restrictive.
Though Cliff seems to have been chary of putting it in those
terms, his successor has been somewhat more candid. In urging
that any lowering of wilderness standards to accommodate "restored" areas be confined to the East, Chief John McGuire argued:
There are several reasons for maintaining such a distinction.
If almost any of the restored eastern national forest lands ...
were deemed to meet present Wilderness Act criteria, it would
be extremely difficult to define a degree of disturbance that
would disqualify many millions of acres of Federal lands for wilderness consideration. These listed areas have almost all been
substantially altered by man's work. Should such areas be considered as "primeval," vast areas within the various Federal
land systems could also qualify. The uniqueness of the present
wilderness system would disappear.
The national forest system has been established for a multiplicity of land uses and services. These publicly owned lands
provide timber, wildlife habitat, water, forage, and developed
recreation sites and experiences. Just as it is important to assure preservation of a portion of our Nation's land heritage for

of course, always leaves the option of simply closing the area to use, or
at least restricting it,
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wilderness purposes, it is necessary to have a relatively stable
base for providing these other resources and uses on a permanent, sustained yield basis.
A "restored" lands definition of wilderness for all national
forest lands could markedly reduce the management options for
a great portion of the national forests in the West. Wilderness
designation means that a number of other resource values and
opportunities are foregone. For example, watershed improvements, wildlife habitat improvement projects, timber harvesting,
range improvement, other vegetative alteration projects and developed recreation are not permitted within wilderness. Even
the development of limited "back-country" recreation
facilities,
without road construction would be foreclosed. 90

The ultimate question, of course, is why the standards should
be restrictive. What began as a question of environmental "suitability" has become a question of what the Service calls "availability" and "need." Not how much land looks like wilderness,
but how much wilderness we can afford to preserve 'becomes
the focus of the issue.
C. EcoNoMIc CRITERIA
Casting the classification problem in the above form suggests that, perhaps, the economic analysis proposed for judging
the suitability of individual areas may also be useful in gauging
the need for overall preservation. This tool has yet to gain acceptance, however. Thus, it is not surprising that, in expressing Forest Service policy on the extent of wilderness preservation, former Chief Cliff chose to avoid putting the issue in terms of
economic allocation but couched it rather in terms of maintaining quality.9 1 Until recently the Forest Service has not made
much use of economic analysis in its primitive area review process. Even now, one senses it is groping somewhat in deciding
just how and to what degree an economic analysis, beyond crude
thumbnail calculations, will aid in decision-making. For example, the degree of enthusiasm for the kind of benefit-cost analysis used for preliminary assessment of roadless areas92 varies
depending on whom one talks to in the agency. Outside the
agency, however, no such uncertainty clouds the thinking of the
major factions in the wilderness debate. The timber industry is
quite certain economic analysis is necessary, while most preservationists seem equally convinced such analysis is simply a tool
of the commodity-user interests.
90. Hearings on S. 316 and Related Bills, supra note 76, at 23-24.
91. See text accompanying note 87 supra.
92. See text accompanying notes 58-61 supra.
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The attitude of those who want to avoid considering the economics of wilderness seems to me a strange one, but it is one
with which we need to reckon. To begin with, it is plain that
this is an economic problem insofar as it involves an allocation of
scarce resources. If it were not an economic problem, it would
not be a problem at all. To be sure, the issue is not merely an
economic one; it is also a political, social, and even a cultural
one. This is true of virtually all problems important enough to
discuss, however; an economic problem does not cease to be one
merely because of the presence of such other elements. All of
this is trivially true and would hardly warrant mention were it
not for the tendency of some preservationists to regard the issue of wilderness as one somehow wholly removed from economic considerations.
Characterizing the issue as an economic one does not itself
indicate the appropriate solution, but it does suggest a particular
way of analyzing the issues.93 Here, it would seem, is the real
explanation for resistance to defining the problem in economic
terms-it is not the economic characterization as such but rather
the calculus generally attending it that inspires opposition. In
short, it is argued that the problem may be an economic one but
economic analysis is inappropriate, or at least so inadequate that
it is not worth the bother.0 4 This attitude is hard to understand
as anything but a confusion as to what economic analysis claims
to accomplish, although perhaps, too, it reflects a confusion of
economic analysis in general with a particular economic situation. In its broadest sense economic analysis is simply the evaluation of alternative choices under conditions of scarcity. Its distinctive contribution is its insistence on a careful and complete
valuation of the alternatives and on a choice of the alternative
with the greater value.
It is this valuation process that is most suspected 'by preservationists. The notion appears to be widespread that wilderness
represents intangible values, impossible to measure; thus, no
93. The best single discussion is that of the ORRRC REPoRT No. 3,
supra note 1, at 203-64, which also contains a useful bibliography of the
pertinent theoretical literature. Other analyses include Hines, Wilderness: Economic Choice, Values and the Androscoggin, in WnmENmss
AND
= QuALITY or L=, 74-80 (1969) (generally critical of economic
analysis, at least to the extent of formal benefit-cost analysis); Hughes,
Wilderness and Economics, 66 J. FOREsTRY 855 (1968).
94. See, e.g., Hines, supra note 93, who argues against benefit-cost
analysis because it too clearly simulates the private market choices that
he finds inadequate.
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equation between wilderness and competing uses is conceivable.
This view is -by no means confined to preservationists, since a
similar sentiment was recorded in interviews with Forest Service
officials. One official asked, "How can you put a price tag on solitude and spiritual refreshment?" The question reflects a rather
basic misunderstanding of how a pricing system works, and so
mistakes the nature of the problem. There is nothing inherent
in wilderness land, however intangible, that prevents it from being priced. Wilderness is no different than any other scarce resource that produces intangible satisfaction. A rubber ball is
valued for the intangible thrill it produces when bounced, a Rembrandt painting for the intangible pleasure derived from viewing
it, a church for the spiritual uplift it affords. But we do not
give away rubber balls, Rembrandt paintings, or the building
materials with which churches are made. The problem is not
that the value of wilderness is immeasurable; it is simply that
here, in contrast to rubber balls, Rembrandt paintings, and
stained glass windows, the resource has not been left to market
forces but has been allocated by administrative and political decisions.
The economic theory often raised in defense of this refusal
to value wilderness is that wilderness, like many other land
resources, is a "public good" for which private prices are an inappropriate measure of social value.95 We need not pause to
consider the concept of public goods, so exhaustively developed
by modern economic theory. 96 I am willing to accept the reason95. A useful analysis of the concept of public goods as applied to
wilderness is given in the ORRRC REPoRT No. 3, supra note 1, at 20507.
96.

See generally P.

STEnE,

PuBLic

ExPENDrmURE

BuDGEnG

(1969). The most restrictive concept of public goods is that of the socalled "collective consumption" good, which is consumed "collectively"
by the public at large and cannot be withheld from individuals unwilling
to pay. See, e.g., Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure,
36 Rxv. EcoN. & STAT. 387 (1954). If one applies the concept rigorously,
there are few goods which qualify. Other than national defense, it is
difficult to think of goods the consumption of which is inherently indivisible and which cannot be withheld from "free riders." The fact that
most cases of actual government expenditure do not fully meet the criteria suggests an apparent artificiality of this theory. See Margolis, A
Comment on the Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 37 Rnv. EcoN. &
STAT. 347-48 (1955).
The limited scope of the collective consumption
good concept has led some economists to develop a broader category of
public goods. These are "merit goods," goods provided by the private
market, but not in the amount which "society," through the political
process, deems appropriate. See R. MusRAv.E, TE THEORY or PuBIac FINANCE ch. 1 (1960). Whether this concept is anything more than a description of those goods that are in fact provided by collective choice may
be debated. Certainly it seems to be an elastic concept.
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ableness of public choice.9 7 Public choice does not mean irrational choice, however, and in any formulation of criteria for rational choice, it is difficult to see how economic factors-considerations of economic costs and benefits-can be avoided. Even
a decision not specifically articulated in economic terms clearly
has an economic consequence. For example, a decision to opt for
wilderness preservation without considering the value of the
productive uses sacrificed is tantamount to a decision that the
value of wilderness exceeds any probable value of those resources. That is an economic choice however it is rationalized.
The real question is whether, and to what extent, the economic
consequence will be clearly and rationally identified in the
choice.
It is one thing to identify the relevance and importance of
economic factors, but quite another to describe the methodology
and the detail of the analysis to be incorporated into the decisionmaking process. Of course, if the choice were left to the market, the interplay of market processes would take care of allocation. But since it has been decided that the market is inadequate to measure the full social values involved, the task becomes one of applying some kind of benefit-cost analysis. 98
Calculating the benefits of wilderness preservation is obviously the difficult part of the task. As emphasized earlier, this
does not mean that wilderness value is intrinsically beyond the
measure of price, but only that in the absence of a market mechanism for pricing this resource there is no clear measure of its
value. One can describe in general terms some of the value, as attempted at the outset of this Article, but that brings us no closer
to a solution of the problem. Alternatively, one might construct an imputed demand schedule, based on the expenditures
persons incur in connection with visits to a particular area. This
has been suggested for calculating the demand for outdoor recreation generally, 99 and it could be applied to wilderness also.
97. I do not feel compelled to justify this in terms of economic theories, such as Samuelson's collective consumption goods or Musgrave's

merit goods. I am content with Steiner's looser definition of collective
goods as those which "some segment of the public collectively wants and

is prepared to pay for.., other than what the unhampered market will
produce." Steiner, supra note 96, at 70. As he notes, collective goods

need not be always publicly provided; however, in the present case I
doubt that it could be otherwise; hence, collective goods equal public
goods.
98. A very helpful treatment (particularly for the lay reader) is E.
MISHAN, COST-BENEFIT AN&ALYsis (1971).
99. See M. CLAWSON & J. K/ mSc, TnE EcoNovircs OF OumooR
REcREATIox 64-77 (1966).
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However, there are a number of difficulties with this technique,
even as applied to ordinary recreation. Among them is the fact
that the needed information about such costs is difficult to obtain, and even when obtained is not a complete measure of the
value that the visitor places upon the visit. In the case of wilderness the difficulty is even greater in this latter respect. If it is
true that the primary value of wilderness goes beyond its enjoyment by visitors, the use of an imputed demand for wilderness
based on visitor data will, of course, undervalue the wilderness
benefit. For example, one of the values that presumably cannot
be measured by visitor data is what has been described as the
"option demand" for the resource. 0 0 Many persons who have no
present intention of visiting a wilderness would value-and pay
for-the option of permitting themselves or their children to do
so in the future. Even the option-demand theory, however, does
not quite reach to the heart of the broader social value which
wilderness is commonly thought to have and which provides the
basic rationale for public, rather than private, market choice.
We might label this the "social-option" value-the value which
society at large places on having a refuge against civilization, a
place where, in Romain Garry's words, man "can feel safe from
his own cleverness."' 0'1 In part, this is an aggregate of the individual option demand, but it also goes beyond it in the sense
that the value is one which requires a broad social perspective
specially commending itself to public choice rather than to
market determinations.
100. See Weisbrod, Collective-Consumption Services of IndividualConsumption Goods, 78 Q.J. EcoN. 471 (1964).
101. Quoted in ORRRC RE.owr No. 3, supra note 1, at 31. See also
the general discussion of valuation, id. at 213-19. It is in valuation of
the benefits of wilderness that I am most disposed to Hines' critical view
of benefit-cost analysis, note 93, supra. It should be observed, however,
that difficult as it may be to calculate usefully the benefit of wilderness
under the circumstance of public choice, one can construct reasonable
means for comparing different areas in terms of this relative benefit. The
Forest Service has done this in its preliminary analysis of unclassified
roadless areas, evaluating the "effectiveness" of different areas according
to certain criteria: size, scenic quality, isolation (and likely dispersion
of visitors), and variety of experience available. See FAL ENvmoN1mNTaA STATEmENT, supra note 44 at 25-27. These criteria are components of the "need" criterion which the Forest Service has at least in
theory applied in all of its wilderness-review processes. See FSM, supra
note 50, § 2321.13. However, the roadless area review program appears
to be the first instance of weighting and quantifying these components
to measure the relative "need" for particular areas. Notice, however,
that these factors still do not measure "benefit" as such; for that reason
they appear to have quite limited utility in benefit-cost analysis.
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If the benefits of wilderness are extremely difficult to measure, the costs are not, and they are really the more important
part of the benefit-cost analysis. Even if we could derive no
meaningful measure of the value of wilderness benefits, it is essential to rational decision-making to have some notion of the
costs. An initial calculation of the costs may resolve the issue
without the necessity of becoming involved in the difficulties of
valuing benefits. If, for example, the cost of preserving a particular tract is trivially small, then no significant land-use conflict
exists and choice for preservation can be made without further
ado. At the other end of the spectrum, if the demonstrable
costs are determined to be extraordinarily high, it might be that
no conceivable wilderness benefits flowing from the preservation of, say, a marginal increment of land can override them.
As mentioned earlier, just such estimates seem to have characterized most of the economic analysis undertaken in the earlier
stages of the classification process. Conceptually, the determination of cost is simple: it is measured -by the value of the alternatives foregone ("opportunity cost"). In the case of wilderness,
the cost would be the value of timber that cannot be cut, minerals that cannot be withdrawn, and other uses, such as developed recreation, that will be precluded by the wilderness status.
Unlike wilderness benefits, we can obtain price figures for at
least some of these preempted uses since they are sold in the
market.
It is sometimes argued that the protected resources are not
really sacrificed: since they are preserved for the future, they
should be considered more an investment than a current cost.
Quite apart from the dubious assumption that preservation status is one which can be easily reversed when demand for the
resource arises, the notion that nothing is lost in foregoing
present consumption is simple nonsense. This assertion does
not imply that the future value of the resource should not be
considered; that, of course, is taken care of by capital budgeting
techniques that are a part of any efficient management. The
future economic value of the resource is part of the benefit-cost
analysis of resource investment and use. In such an analysis, the
period of investment ("preservation") of, say, a timber stand
will obviously vary, depending on such factors as expected future
yield and the interest (or discount) rate, which reflects the opportunity cost of capital tied up in the investment. But whatever that period would be, it would not correspond to the indefinite preservation of the resource. This is apparent even on
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the most restrictive assumptions. Suppose, for example, that
the economic management objective were to maximize the physical annual productivity of a timber stand. Such an objective
might lead to a relatively long period of investment-up to perhaps 120 years for Douglas fir timber-but it could not lead to
an indefinite preservation. 102 Allowing the stand to go uncut
(or unburned) beyond the period of maximum incremental
growth would yield diminishing physical productivity. If one
introduces more refined notions of capital budgeting, the period
of investment becomes even shorter. Thus, if one seeks not
maximum physical yield but rather maximum economic yield,
the age of the stand might be a fraction of the 120-year period
mentioned above. Depending on the discount rate, the maximum economic yield of a stand may occur at periods as short as
10 3
30 to 60 years.
I am not suggesting that these maximization criteria should
in all cases govern. I cite them simply to demonstrate the
foolishness of the assumption that preservation can be justified
as an economic investment for the future. Not only does preservation not correspond to economic criteria for efficient investment-that is, for efficient allocation of resources over timebut it also is directly antithetical to such a purpose. It is not
just that preservation exceeds the period appropriate for efficient utilization of resources; it also leads to a deterioration in
the economic resource as the forest matures into old age.
Though conservationists are constantly, and correctly, reminding us that a forest left in a natural state can and does renew itself, no one would argue that the economic productivity of an
04
unmanaged forest is equal to that of a well-managed one.
102. The traditional standard for setting the "rotation age" of a timber stand (the age at which it is harvested) is its "biological maturity,"
defined as the culmination of its mean annual growth-the point where
the volume yield of the stand is maximized. The age at which this takes
place varies depending on the tree species, the climate, the soil, and the
management techniques. For Douglas fir (the leading commercial softwood), a rotation age of 100-120 years has been fairly typical, though
under modern management techniques this age is probably beyond the
age at which annual volume yield is maximized. See REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S ADvisoInZ PANEL ON TnmER AND THE ENVIRONMENT 172
(1973).
103. Forest Service, U.S. Dept of Agriculture, Forest Regulation
Study 43-44, 1973 (unpublished, draft report). On economic maximization criteria generally, see K.P. DAvis, FOREST MANAGEMENT 234-42 (2d
ed. 1966); E. MsHA, supra note 98, at 194-97.
104. For illustrative data see, e.g., FOREST SERVIcE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, FOREST RES. REP. No. 20, TnE OuTLooK FOR TInBER IN THE
UNrrED STATES 93-125 (1973), which estimates that selective manage-
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Whether or not the wilderness benefit exceeds the sacrifice in
economic productivity (capital value) has still to be resolved;
the point here is merely that capital value is sacrificed.
Many preservationists insist that refined cost calculations
are really pointless 'because the total amount of land-and resources-that can become wilderness is a trivial portion of the
total land-and resources-of the nation. Thinking simply in
terms of acres, this is clearly true. Suppose, for example, one
were to take all the presently identified 'but unclassified roadless areas (56 million acres), add them to existing wilderness
and primitive areas (about 15 million acres), add a half million acres for Eastern wilderness proposals, and then add all Interior lands which have to date been proposed for wilderness
(about six million acres);1o5 all of this would come to only
about ten percent of all federal lands and something more than
three percent of the nation's lands. 106 But this display of figures, like a parlor trick, hides more than it reveals. What we
are interested in is not gross acreage but productive land; and,
as anyone who drives across the Nevada desert quickly notes
(until he reaches Las Vegas), there is a great deal of land neither
productive nor wilderness. Just how much there is, I do not
know, nor do I see any reason to find out, unless one wants to
engage in the game of numbers, percentages, and ratios. What
really matters is the productive value of the proposed and prospective wilderness, and how much of that value will be lost by
preservation. As to these figures, only partial and very crude
estimates are available now, and they may be all that will ever
be available. So far as the areas presently within the Wilderness
ment practices-only those justified by the condition that they will yield
at least five percent return for the investment-can increase yield three
percent by 1980 and 25 percent by 2020 above that which would be produced by present management practices. The latter already produce
more than unmanaged yield.
105. As of July, 1973, of the 28.5 million acres in the National Park
System scheduled for study, 200,000 acres had been classified as wilderness and 5 million had been recommended for inclusion. Of 29.6 million
acres in the National Wildlife System, 100,000 acres had already been
designated as wilderness and another 900,000 proposed. Finally, the
Bureau of Land Management had classified approximately 154,000 acres
as primitive (these are not formally part of the wilderness system). FRNAL ENvmoNmNrAL STATE1MENT, supra note 44, at 10, 11, 13. Probably
more than 6 million acres will ultimately be proposed for wilderness, but
I think it unlikely that the figure will go very much higher.
106. The gross area of the United States, including Alaska and Hawail, is 2.3 billion acres, of which about 762 million acres are owned or
managed by the federal government.
L&ND STATisrECS 1 (1972).

U.S. DFP'T OF INTEIOR, PUB

JC
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System (including primitive areas not yet reclassified as wilderness) are concerned, there does not appear to be any reliable
calculation of the total productive value of such lands. Although
general mineral and timber surveys have been made in these
areas at some time in the past, many of them are old and
reflect neither current market values nor other present conditions which bear on value (such things as the operability of
timber and the cost of gaining access). Thus, even if early studies had been done with exacting benefit-cost techniques-and
they were not-we would not have a very precise indication of
the current opportunity cost of this wilderness. However, it appears that most of the areas within the existing wilderness system have little productive value. 1' 7 As far as timber is concerned, many of the areas are not even sufficiently productive to
be classified as "commercial forest,"' 08 and much of those areas
which do include commercial forest is only marginally productive. That is in fact why many of them have remained roadless
and "unexploited"; the timber was not worth the high cost of
access. To preserve such lands involves, then, little loss in timber value. When one further considers the very poor return on
investment from active management of marginal timber lands,
and then adds to that the unrecovered environmental costs (such
as soil erosion) of access to and removal of timber from lands of
low productivity, it is apparent that the opportunity cost of preserving such lands as wilderness is close to zero.'0 9 Indeed, quite
apart from the question of wilderness preservation, it has been
argued that the low rate of return on investment makes it uneconomic to manage such marginally productive lands for sustainedyield timber production. 1 0
107. See M. Clawson, Conflicts, Strategies, and Possibility for Consensus in Forest Land Use and Management 22-24 (unpublished paper
prepared for Resources for the Future Forum, May 8-9, 1974).
108. The Forest Service standard for commercial timberland requires
an annual yield of 20 cubic feet per acre. FSM, supra note 50, § 2412.14.
109. See M. CLAWSON & B. HELD, THE FEDERAL LANs 77 (1957).
110. This was the conclusion of the so-called Bolle Report on the Bitterroot National Forest in Idaho and Montana. SELEcr CoAvvnm OF T=
UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA, A UNIVERSITY VIEw OF r=s FOREST SERVICE, S.
Doc. No. 115, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). It should be noted that the
Northern Region and northern portions of the Intermountain Region, to
which the Report's conclusions were primarily directed, account for a
giant share of the current Wilderness System. For example, approximately one-half of the existing national forest wilderness and primitive
land is in four states: Idaho, Montana, Utah, and Wyoming. See U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRicULTuRE & U.S. DEP'T OF = INTERIOR, EIGHTH ANxuAL REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE NATIONAL WILDERNESs PRESERVATION SYSTEM,

H.R. Doc. No. 357, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 19, at Appendix V (1972)
[hereinafter cited as EIGHTH ANNuAL REPORT].
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Turning from existing primitive and wilderness areas to
other roadless areas, a first glance at the inventory of such
areas suggests that the generalizations that hold for the existing
System also hold for much of this land. Of a total inventory
of some 56 million acres, only about 18.6 million are commercial
forest and some of that is, again, in a region of low productivity
which may be uneconomic to harvest."' However, the first appearance may be deceptive. Forest Service estimates put the
total annual allowable cut for all of the 56 million acres at
some 2.3 billion board-feet, by no means an insignificant volume.1 2 More important (though also less reliable) are the estimates of total opportunity cost for the roadless areas, including not only timber value but also the values of other major resource uses which preservation would foreclose and the cost
outlays for establishing and maintaining the wilderness. The
total opportunity cost for all 56 million acres is estimated at over
$2.5 billion.113
The above figures suggest merely the rough parameters
of what is involved in the unclassified roadless areas; they indicate that the costs of preservation, while not overwhelming,
are not negligible either. Beyond that, it is not possible to be
more exact, for the specific calculations made .by the Forest
Service are not only preliminary but also ambiguous as to
some of the underlying assumptions. For example, it is unclear
in light of other investment opportunities whether all of the
timber for which value was calculated is operable, or in any
111. See DRAr ENVoNmsENTAL STATE1mNT, supra note 47, Appendix A, at 2-a. It is particularly noteworthy that the Intermountain Region accounts for some 11.5 million acres of roadless area, one-fifth of
the total; however, the total annual allowable harvest from such lands
is a mere 172 million board-feet-less than the cut of some single forests
in the Pacific Northwest. The total annual allowable cut calculated for
the entire 18.6 million commercial forest acres within roadless areas is
2.3 billion board-feet, half of which ia in the Pacific Northwest (Oregon
and Washington) and Alaska.
112. Id. at 37; Appendix A, at 38-a. One difficulty here is that the
figure appears to include total inventory on the lands whether or not all
of the timber is operable. On the 12.3 million acres finally selected as
New Study Areas, the estimated annual allowable harvest is 299 million
board-feet, about two percent of the current total for the national forests. FnAL EoNTr.AL
STATEmENT, supra note 44, at 77, 90. Again
the estimate is at least ambiguous as to whether all of this is operable
timber.
113. DRAFT ENVIOmmNTAL STATEMENT, supra note 47, Appendix A,
at 37-a. The figure for the finally selected New Study Areas alone is approximately $238 million. FinAL ENVIONM NTAL STATEMENT, supra note
44, at 77.
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case economically sound to manage. It is doubtful, however,
whether it would be worthwhile to attempt a more precise and
detailed calculus for the entire roadless acreage, or even for the
12.3 million acres designated by the Forest Service as New Study
Areas. As discussed previously, it would greatly simplify matters if we could deal in nationwide terms, for then compromise
tradeoffs between preservation and, say, timber values, would be
much easier to make. Unfortunately, a nationwide approach
seems out of the question for the reason previously stated:
the controversy over wilderness is inevitably a local one. 1 4 It
seems inevitable that there is no alternative but to engage in a
case-by-tiresome-case appraisal of the costs and, if possible, the
benefits, until every acre of potential wilderness has been examined. It will be a long process.
V. PRESERVING WILDERNESS
To date, paramount public attention has been fixed on the
question of establishing wilderness while, outside of a few exceptional instances or matters of special local interest,"1 5 problems
of managing it have clearly been of secondary public interest.
To some it will no doubt appear strange even to talk of managing a wilderness-by common understanding as well as by ap114. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
115. Probably the most noteworthy example is the Boundary Waters
Canoe Area (BWCA), where controversy has raged for years over allowing timber cutting, mineral exploration, and the use of motorboats and
snowmobiles in the wilderness. See, e.g., Izaak Walton League of America v. St. Clair, 353 F. Supp. 698 (D. Minn. 1973), rev'd, 497 F.2d 849 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3274 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1974) (mineral exploration); Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 358 F.
Supp. 584 (D. Minn. 1973), af-'d, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974), prelim.
injunction granted n other grounds, No. 4-72-Civil-598 (D. Minn., Sept.
18, 1974) (timber cutting). See generally SIRRA CLUB, A WnaRaN.ss
n C-isis-THE BouNDAY WATRis CANOE AREA (1970). Recently the
BWCA controversy has escalated in response to the Forest Service's proposed multiple-use plan, which, by steering a middle course between
preservationists on the one hand and users on the other, has resulted in
displeasing both sides equally. See FOREST SERVIcE, U.S. DEP'T oF AGRICULTURE, BOUNDARY WATERS CANOE AREA MANAGEMENT PLAN AND ENw-

STATEMENT (1974); Minnesota Public Interest Research
Group v. Butz, No. 4-72-Civil-598 (D. Minn., Sept. 18, 1974) (challenge,
inter alia, to adequacy of environmental statement); In re Boundary Waters Canoe Area Management Plan, Appeal of Sierra Club, North Star
Chapter (filed Oct. 16, 1974) (appeal of the management plan to Chief
of Forest Service). The BWCA, however, is an exceptional case; many
of the activities and uses (timber cutting, use of motors) have been permitted in the area under special legislation unique to the BWCA. See
note 118 infra.
RONmNTAL
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parent congressional design,1 6 a wilderness is an area left to nature's own devices. Unfortunately, the matter is not so simple.
Surrounded by an urban, industrialized civilization, even a wilderness cannot be preserved by declaration alone. At the very
least, administration is required to interpret-or establish-and
enforce restrictions on access and use." 7
Initially, the task is one of interpreting and enforcing statutory restrictions on access to and activities within wilderness.
The basic statutory restrictions have been discussed earlier; essentially, they forbid commercial uses such as timber harvesting" 8 and livestock grazing (except where established prior to
the Act). As noted earlier, a special exception was provided
for mining and mineral exploration, which may continue until
116. For a Forest Service directive to the same effect, see FSM, supra
note 50, § 2320.
117. On the agency's management functions within wilderness areas,
see Cliff, supra note 53, at 10-11.
118. One exception is Minnesota's Boundary Waters Canoe Area
(BWCA). When the area was first set aside for special administrative
protection, timber harvesting in parts of the area (the portal zone, or
outer boundaries) was permitted to continue. In 1930, Congressprompted primarily by proposals to construct hydroelectric power projects in the area-enacted the Shipstead-Nolan Act which gave special
statutory protection to the area in order to conserve its natural beauty.
Act of July 10, 1930, ch. 881, 46 Stat. 1020 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 577577b (1970)). As with the prior administrative scheme, the statute did
not establish the BWCA formally as a wilderness area, and it specifically
recognized continued logging in the area (logging, however, was prohibited within 400 feet of lakeshores). The Wilderness Act specifically provides that the terms of the Shipstead-Nolan Act continue to apply to the
1BWCA, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(a) (2) (1970), and that, notwithstanding the
Wilderness Act, the management of the BWCA shall remain subject to
prior regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture "in accordance with the
general purpose of maintaining, without unnecessary restrictions on other
uses, including that of timber, the primitive character of the area." 16
U.S.C. § 1133(d) (5) (1970). The Forest Service has continued to permit
timber cutting in the portal zone, prompting challenges from local conservationists. At this time, a federal district court has enjoined the cutting until it can determine the adequacy of an environmental impact
statement regarding a management plan for the BWCA which anticipates
continued cutting in that area, BouNDARY WATERS CANOE ARsA MAXAGEMENT PLAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT, supra note 115, and until

a determination of the plaintiff's claim that timber harvesting activities
are prohibited in the BWCA by provisions of the Wilderness Act. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, No. 4-72-civil-598 (I).
Minn., Sept. 18, 1974). For the previous history of this case, see Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584 (D. Minn.
1973), affd, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974) (certain timber cutting activities in BWCA enjoined until completion of the environmental impact
statement). See also In T'e Boundary Waters Canoe Area Management
Plan, Appeal of Sierra Club, North Star Chapter (filed Oct. 16, 1974)
(appeal of the management plan to Chief of Foreat Service).
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1984.110 For the most part, these general statutory restrictions
on wilderness use do not impose on the agencies any significant burden either of interpretation-the courts have taken
that out of their hands-or of administrative implementationthe restrictions are self-enforcing. With some of the other restrictions, however, the administrative responsibility has been
more weighty.
The use of motorized equipment has caused special difficulty. Although the Act generally bans the use of motorized
equipment (including vehicles) within wilderness areas, a number of exceptions are provided: (1) the use of motorboats or
aircraft established before the Act may continue subject to
agency restrictions; (2) the use of equipment for mining or mineral exploration is permitted; (3) the use of roads or motor transport is impliedly authorized where it is necessary for obtaining
access to private land within the area; (4) the use of motor
vehicles or other equipment is permitted where they are necessary either for handling emergencies or for administrative
purposes.

1 20

We can set aside the mineral exploration problem, for the
119. The exception was for a time eliminated by the federal district
court decision in Izaak Walton League of America v. St. Clair, 353 F.
Supp. 698 (D. Minn. 1973), which declared that mining and mineral exploration conflicted with the objectives of the Wilderness Act and that
the latter override the former. The decision was reversed by the court
of appeals, 497 F.2d 849 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3274 (U.S.
Nov. 12, 1974), which found Congress' clear language to the contrary controlling. Id. at 853. The decision of the court of appeals seems entirely
sound. While one might agree, as a matter of personal taste, that mining
and mineral exploration are incompatible with wilderness, it is surely
a remarkable piece of arrogance for a court to nullify Congress' very
clear decision to permit it nevertheless. If in fact the consequence is to
destroy the wilderness character, is this not within the power of Congress
to do? If Congress wishes to declare an area as a "wilderness, vacation,
and training ground for the 7th Cavalry Division," are we to suppose that
Congress could not do so because "wilderness," "vacation," and "training
ground for the 7th Cavalry" are, to all reasoning minds, inconsistent?
120. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1133(c), (d) (1970); see also FSM, supra note 50,
§ 2326.1; AmmumT'ATE POLICIES, supra note 54, at 42-43. Again an exception is made for the Minnesota Boundary Waters where the Act allows the continuance of uses and activities previously authorized; further, the Act specifically allows the continued use of motorboats within
areas where their use has already been established. 16 U.S.C. § 1133
(d) (5) (1970). The use of motorboats and snowmobiles is currently restricted to certain routes, and the Forest Service has recently proposed
to restrict their use further. See BOUNDARY WATERS CANOE AaEA MANAGEMENT PLAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT, supra note 115.

In the national parks, motor-powered craft are also banned except
where their use was established prior to an area's inclusion in wilderness.
AMnqIsTRATVE POLICIES, supra note 54K, at 43.
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use of particular equipment is an integral part of the larger
anomaly of mining and mineral exploration within wilderness
areas. Once that basic incongruity is accepted, the use of motorized equipment poses no special problem. Conversely, if mining
and mineral exploration were to be prohibited, the problem of
motors would be solved.
The problem of access to private inholdings is a significant
one. Within the exterior boundaries of the nearly 15 million
acres of national forest wilderness and primitive areas are extensive private lands with the only access to many of these
lands being across wilderness. While the agencies can regulate
this access, they cannot restrict it to a point where it would be
in effect destroyed. 121 The problem of private inholdings is particularly acute in the case of the national forests; there the Forest Service has attempted to diminish this problem of regulating access, together with the more general problem presented
'by nonconforming private uses within wilderness areas, through
gradual acquisition of the private lands by purchase or exchange. 2 2 However, given the funds at its disposal, it is not likely
that the Forest Service will be able to rid itself of this problem
within the immediate future. If anything, the problem is likely
12 3
to be compounded by the addition of the New Study Areas.
More troublesome than the problem of restricting modes of
private access is that of determining means of access for emergencies and administrative purposes. In conformance with its
approach to wilderness classification, the Forest Service has taken
a "purist" approach in regard to both its own activities and those
of other agencies (for example, agencies conducting scientific investigations). Motorized equipment or vehicles are authorized
only under very limited circumstances and only with the ap121. Quite apart from the provisions of the Act which preserve private rights of access, any substantial curtailment of access would constitute an impairment of the value of the private property and, thus, a "taking" for which the fifth amendment requires compensation.
122. Purchases are made under section 6 of the Land and Water Conservation Act of 1965, 16 U.S.C. § 4601-9 (1970). Exchanges are made
under authority of the General Exchange Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 485-86 (1970)
and the Transfer Act of 1960, 7 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970).
The National Park Service, on the other hand, seeks to exclude inholdings from any area classified as wilderness. Such inholdings are acquired by the agency if possible, and then if suitable they are proposed
for designation as wilderness. ADnmnsTRA=V PouciEs, supra note 54, at
43.:
123. This will depend in large measure on how much latitude is
given the agency in drawing the boundaries of wilderness to exclude
areas with substantial private inholdings.
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proval of the forest supervisor or a higher official. 124 As in the
case of wilderness classification, the restrictive policies of the
Forest Service have brought it criticism from various groups
such as outfitters and backpackers who want to use power saws
to cut fuel wood or to blaze trails; mining companies or agencies such as the Geological Survey that want to use helicopters
to make mineral or other scientific surveys; and so on.125' For
example, when two students in an Outward Bound program were
killed in a wilderness area, a local Forest Service official refused
to permit the use of a helicopter to recover the bodies because
the students were already dead and therefore no emergency existed that would justify the use of a helicopter. The refusal was
later reversed by the Chief, who denied that the initial decision
reflected Forest Service policy. 12 The reversal, however, did not
prevent criticism of the initial action on the evident assumption
that it did indeed reflect the basic attitude of the agency towards wilderness. That assumption seems to be accurate but the
criticism itself dubious. It is not at all obvious that helicopters
should be used in a case involving no question of actual rescue.
Indeed, even in many rescue cases the use of helicopters or other
motor vehicles might be reasonably debated. Suppose, for example, a group of experienced, adult backpackers become lost in a
124. FSM, supra note 50, § 2326.11 permits use of motor vehicles or
equipment in four situations:
1. Where there is an inescapable urgency and need for speed beyond that available by primitive means (such as for fire suppression, safety or law enforcement).
2. A problem exists the solution of which is necessary to meet
wilderness objectives, and which cannot reasonably be met
with the use of primitive methods.
3. Limitations of time, season, finance, etc., make use of primitive methods for an essential wilderness administration activity either impractical or impossible.
4. For continuance of an essential program established prior to
the Act.
In the first situation, the supervisor's approval is required. All others
require approval by the regional forester, and the Chief himself must
approve all use of heavy equipment. Requests by other government
agencies for such uses are considered in light of the same criteria; many
have been denied. EIGHTH ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 110, at 5.
The National Park Service policy is similar, banning the use of motorized vehicles or equipment, but it provides only one exception of a
more general nature: "except as otherwise provided herein to meet the
needs of management." AmnnxsTRrTmE PoLicIEs, supra note 54, at 44.
Specific provision for the use of such devices is made elsewhere with regard to fire control and rescue or emergency operations. Id. at 42.
125. See Cliff, supra note 53, at 11.
126. See Hearings on Eastern Wilderness Areas Before the Subcomm.
on Public Lands of the Senate Comm. n Interior and Insular Affairs,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1973) (statement of Senator Hatfield).
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wilderness on a scheduled 10-day trip. After they have been
gone, say, three days past their scheduled return, their families
ask that helicopters be dispatched to search for them. On just
the facts recited it seems to me that the value of sending a helicopter or other mechanized vehicle into the area is genuinely
doubtful. If that seems harsh, it is so only because that is what
the wilderness condition implies. Even granted a sympathetic
instinct and an explicit congressional recognition that emergencies justify some qualification of the wilderness condition, lines
must be drawn somewhere; and if wilderness is to mean anything, the line must be a fairly severe one. Otherwise, why stop
at helicopter rescues? Why not construct permanent rescue
roads, aid stations, or telephone lines? At some point on this
slippery slope of logical "next steps," it becomes difficult to see
any real point to wilderness preservation. I am not suggesting
mechanical devices ought never to be permitted for emergency
or administrative purposes, but rather that any restriction giving
meaningful recognition to wilderness as an area of "primeval
character" will be regarded by many, particularly by those unsympathetic to the wilderness ideal, as unnecessary and harsh.
The use of mechanized equipment and vehicles for purposes
of meeting the needs of administrative management raises the
more general issue of what those needs are. A major problem in
this respect has been defining the proper scope of various protective activities such as fire control and disease prevention.
Taking a very purist view, the question of what measures to apply to protect wilderness against the depredations of fire, insects, and disease would seem to-admit of but a single answernone. Whatever else a wilderness is supposed to be, the Wilderness Act declares it an area "affected primarily by the forces of
nature." That would imply that at least natural fires 127 ought
to be permitted to burn, and insects and disease to work their
destruction-in short, that natural ecological forces be given free
play. Such a laissez-faire policy is dictated not simply out of respect for the wilderness ideal, but also because it is essential to
maintain the vitality of the natural environment. Control of
127. I am informed by Forest Service officials that in Western forests

lightning-caused fires greatly predominate over those caused by man.

This fact should be particularly true of wilderness areas where human

use is relatively slight and stands in contrast to the nationwide incidence
of wildfires, which were predominantly man-caused in the period 1966
to 1970. Glascock, Forces Shaping the Public Opinion Toward Fire and
the Environment, in Syvmosnum ON Fre n THE ENvmoumET 65-68
(Forest Service, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, No. 276, 1972).
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insects, disease, and fire interferes with the process by which
the forest rejuvenates itself.12 8 With timber cutting banned
from wilderness, these natural processes become the only means
by which old timber is removed and forest regeneration is fostered.
Unfortunately, a completely laissez-faire solution is ruled out
by the fact that these natural forces do not recognize wilderness,
or even public, boundaries. The fire that sweeps through a wilderness may sweep across adjoining public or private lands
as well. The problem has been to find a balance of protection
that reasonably meets both the needs of the wilderness and the
interests of adjacent land owners. The early response of the Forest Service was one of vigorous prevention and control of fire in
particular. Since then, however, its policy has shifted towards
the giving of greater latitude to natural forces. Insect and disease control is normally not undertaken unless the danger threatens to spread to other lands or unless the epidemic presents a
29
greater threat to wilderness values than does the control.'
The stated policy on fire is a bit vague, partly because it appears
to be still evolving; in general, however, this policy, like that
established for insect or disease control, appears to be one which
aims for a "less aggressive" control of fire in those wilderness
areas where life, private property, and lands outside the area will
not be endangered. 3 0
In recent years, many conservationists have urged that controlled burning be used as a tool of forest management, particu128. See Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 358 F.
Supp. 584, 609-17 (D.Minn. 1973).
129. FSM, supra note 50, §§ 2324.1-.12. The Park Service follows a
similar policy. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF TsE INTERIOR, AnwISTRATV POLICIES FOR NATURAL AREAS OF rE NATIONAL PAmR SYSTEM

56 (rev. ed. 1968). Insect and disease control seems contrary to the wilderness ideal, but it can perhaps be justified on the grounds that to the
extent fire is artificially controlled, it eliminates the natural check on the
spread of insects and disease.
130. See FSM, supra note 50, §§ 2324.2-.24. The quote is that of
former Chief Cliff in Hearings, "Clear-Cutting" Practices on Federal
Timber Lands, Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands of the Senate
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 866 (1971).
Cliff's statement is, incidentally, an indication of the vagueness on this
question. In one sentence he denied that the Service permits fires to
burn as an environmental control; in the very next he stated it uses a
less aggressive form of control-which would seem to be the same thing
as permissive burning. I was told by agency officials that present policy
is definitely one of permissive burning, subject to the two conditions
stated above. See text accompanying note 129 supra. Again, the Park
Service policy is similar, see AX flSmTRAV POLICIES FOR NATURAL AREAS
oF wiiE WATiOsAT, PA= Sysum, supra note 129, at 56,
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]arly in wilderness areas.' 3 1 Although controlled burning to aid
wildlife and range management or as a means of clean-up and
site preparation in timber harvest areas has been employed, there
has been a reluctance to embrace this method of ecological control more generally. One problem is that of containing the
spread of the fire. Another is that controlled burning, while
emulating natural forces, is an artificial interference with those
forces, only slightly different than cutting trees. However, both
objections are at least partially countered by the fact that burning is required because of the agencies' own prior suppression
of natural fire, the effect of which has been to build up excessive
"fuel" in the forest to the point where the outbreak of any fire
creates the risk of a conflagration. 13 2 In apparent recognition of
this, the Forest Service has now endorsed controlled burning in
wilderness areas, subject to approval by the Chief of the Forest
Service. 1 33 Just how vigorously such a program should be pushed
at this time is debatable. Carefully implemented, there are benefits to such a policy-not only in wilderness areas but in other
areas also. On the other hand there are at present substantial
gaps in our knowledge of the ecological and economic consequences of controlled burning and of the techniques for burning
effectively and safely (with an acceptable risk of the burning
spreading out of control); all of these dangers counsel a cautious
approach to the use of this management tool.'3
The most serious threat to wilderness, however, is far more
subtle than commercial exploitation or natural depredations
such as fire, pests, or disease: it is excessive use by individuals. The problem runs essentially parallel to that of recreational use of the forests in general; like the more general problem, indications are that it will become increasingy more troublesome. In 1970, nearly six million visitor-days were reported
for areas in the wilderness system. 35 Even if this figure in131. See, e.g., Leopold, Ecological Requirements of the Wilderness
Act, in WnLERNESS AND THE QuATmr or L=F 188-97 (1969); Heinselman,
PreservingNature in Forested Wilderness Areas and National Parks, 44
NAT. PARKs & CONSERV. MAG., Sept., 1970, at 8.

132. See Leopold, supra note 131.
133. FSM, supra note 50, § 2324.24. The National Park Service approves prescribed burning in genera], see ADiNSRATRVE PoLIcIs, supra
note 54, at 17, but makes no mention of its use in wilderness areas.
134. For an interesting discussion of some of the uncertainties in controlled burning see Zivnuska, Economic Tradeoffs in Fire Management,
in Symposium oN FIE in THE ENVIRONMENT 69-74 (Forest Service, U.S.
Dep't of Agriculture, No. 276, 1972).
PIJESIENT'S ADVSQRY PANEL, supra note 102, at
135. REPORT OF T
4.94,
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creased only at the same rate as general recreational use, the
danger to wilderness is evident. In fact, however, wilderness use
is expected to increase at a higher rate, 36 compounding an already serious future threat to wilderness preservation.
The problem of overcrowding is particularly acute for wilderness because of its very limited, and relatively fixed, carrying
capacity. In part, this limited capacity is a consequence of the
particularly fragile character of most wilderness. As noted earlier, the very absence of exploitation typically attests to the relatively low productivity of these areas. Soils are often shallow;
vegetation is insecure and can easily be damaged, even by soil
compaction. Once damaged, the land and vegetation recover
very slowly. The carrying capacity of a wilderness, however, is
set not only by the tolerance of which the physical environment
is capable, but also by the psychological impact which use has
upon the wilderness experience of the "users"'13 7 themselves. At
least in some areas, this latter aspect may 'be the controlling factor in determining the maximum capacity of the wilderness, calling for a lower level of use than would considerations of environmental protection. Thus, an area capable of tolerating, say,
1000 visitor-days a month without serious environmental impact
may in fact tolerate only a fraction of that when "psychological congestion" effects are taken into account. A wilderness in
which one encounters two or three campers each hour over the
period of a 12-hour day may still retain its physical vitality, but
it would hardly seem like much of a wilderness. This would particularly be the case where, in order to protect the physical environment against those 24 to 36 persons, the Forest Service adds
outdoor privies.
This psychological aspect adds a most difficult dimension to
the problem of overuse. Unlike the physical constraints associated with maintaining the ecology, the wilderness experience
can hardly be defined, yet alone measured. We are back to the
conundrum raised earlier in regard to the initial decision whether
or not to preserve land: what is wilderness? Yet in a way
the problem here is more vexing, for it forces the agency
-and the public-to articulate more precisely the concept of
136. For example, Lucas, Wilderness Perception and Use: The Example of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area, 3 NAT. REs. J. 394, 398 (1964),
estimates a tenfold increase in wilderness visitor days as against a threefold increase in general outdoor recreation visitor days.
137. I here use the term "users" in a broad sense, to include persons
who enjoy or appreciate wilderness vicariously or indirectly, as well as
those who actually enter wilderness areas.
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wilderness (and that of wilderness "experience"). Initial decisions to remove land from economically productive use can
usually be made without any clear conception of what wilderness
means. Given a political decision to preserve some lands, a determination of "suitability" (as distinct from "availability") can
be made on the basis of scenery, or a very gross judgment about
the capacity for solitude, and so on; but there is no occasion for
defining precisely what is meant by "solitude" or the other attributes of wilderness. A decision to establish a limit on use,
however, requires just such a definition. It is a very difficult
one to make; not only is there no ready-made standard, but
there is no fully satisfactory process for setting one.
In several areas, visitors have been polled to see how they
define the wilderness experience. In general the results show
that most wilderness visitors seek a high degree of "purity";
they value solitude and react adversely to encounters with other
visitors or to evidence of other use (particularly in the form of
litter). 388 One difficulty with such surveys is that they test a
very selected sample because they are limited to actual, rather
than potential, users. Thus, the sample population is biased in
the direction of whatever expectations have been created for the
particular area. A very "pure" wilderness-with low visitor
density, no significant evidence of use, and few or no facilities
-is likely to attract primarily a very select population of visitors who place high value on that purity. It follows that any
poll of such a group will produce a significant majority, at
least, in favor of purity. On the other hand, an area that has,
and shows, a high density of use will draw visitors from a
'broader, more "tolerant" (if that is the word) population. The
logic can be followed through the entire spectrum of recreational
experience, from a backpack adventure in the High Sierras to
an afternoon at Coney Island. If the latter seems far-fetched, consider the proposal of one writer who, far from seeking solitude,
proposed the construction of aerial tramways into wilderness so
that it might be enjoyed by all.139 One wonders how the tramway rider would respond to the pollster's question, what is wilderness?
There is, of course, good reason for selecting as a benchmark the standards of the most discriminating wilderness visit138. See Stankey, A Strategy for the Definition and Management of
Wilderness Quality, in NATuRAL ENVmoiuETs 88 (J. Krutilla ed. 1972).
139. See Jubler, Let's Open Up (O4rWilderness Areas, P.FmE' D VEST, May, 1972, at 125.
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ors, since those standards provide the foundation for achieving a high degree of purity. Indeed, for that reason recent surveys have not been content with polling visitors in general but
have differentiated between the true purists and those less insistent on purity. The underlying rationale is that wilderness
should serve the purists, and the rest should be accommodated
by other recreational lands. 140 As a general proposition, this is
an appealing rationale. We can scarcely justify going to the opposite extreme and consulting everyone, for the very concept of
wilderness preservation cuts against the grain of popular, majoritarian taste. If we simply counted noses, it is unlikely we
would have wilderness at all.
And yet, the visitor-sampling technique does not really solve
the specific problem of determining the level of purity to be
maintained. To define the level of purity by reference to an admittedly predetermined group of "purists" is evasive: by what
standards is the group to be defined? If we have standards by
which that group can be defined, there is no point in asking
them; the group-defining norm can itself simply be made the
standard of wilderness. Then, of course, the problem is how we
establish the suitability-or legitimacy-of those standards.
In short, reliance upon visitor perception would seem to be
meaningful only in obtaining some measure of the nature and
extent of acceptability of agency standards among those who are
perceived as the primary users (not necessarily beneficiariessince, as I have pointed out, the 'benefits of wilderness must be
supposed to extend beyond users).
It has been suggested that instead of merely asking visitors to
define their ideal of wilderness, visitors might be requested to
order their preferences according to how much they would be
willing to pay for varying conditions (whether they would be required to pay, assuming the responses to be candid, is a separate issue). 14 1 This approach offers some advantages over the
simple poll: in particular, it permits the benefits associated with
a certain level of wilderness preservation/use to be measured in
terms which can thereby be compared with the costs of secur140. See Stankey, supra note 138, at 96-97.
141. See Fisher & Krutilla, Determination of Optimal Capacity of
Resource-Based Recreation Facilities,in NATURAL ENVRmvENTS 115 (J.
Krutilla ed. 1972>. It should be noted that, though the authors consider
the willingness to pay as being separate from actual payment, they do
propose a user charge to ration use. As noted below, such user charges
are now prohibited by statute.
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ing those benefits-for example, the cost of restricting or channeling use to avoid encounters and the cost of additional land
acquisitions. However, this type of poll does not fully answer
the point raised above. Insofar as it is directed at an already selected group, it still presupposes a certain basic standard of use.
Once a determination is made as to carrying capacity, there
remains the problem of deciding how use will be controlled. We
can quickly pass over the alternative of closing the wilderness
to all visitors. Although the Forest Service has indicated that
some of its areas might have to be closed in order to prevent
environmental damage, 142 it is scarcely an appropriate solution
to the problem of overcrowding. Even if such a measure were
politically acceptable-a most dubious assumption-it could be
justified only in cases where no less drastic a solution would be
effective or practicable. It is difficult to imagine a situation
where no control shorb of a total ban would be effective.
Perhaps there could be cases where the environment itself is so
threatened that no further human use should be permitted.
However, as noted earlier, it is the psychological character of the
wilderness experience, not the physical environment, that will
generally set the maximum limit on use. Where this is the case,
to close the area in order to "preserve the wilderness" would
143
make no sense at all.
On the basis of expected use, it is reasonable to predict that
even an efficient system for controlling concentration will
not be adequate without controlling the number of visitors. 144
The crucial task, therefore, is to find an effective and acceptable
basis for rationing visitor use.
One major possibility, rationing by means of a pricing system, has been forbidden by legislative fiat. Under amendments
to the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act, no fees may be
charged except for developed recreational areas where special
facilities or services are provided. 145 The rationale of this legislative prohibition is not entirely clear, since it has not been articulated fully and carefully. In general, it appears to reflect a
common assumption that because wilderness is a "public good,"
142. FSM, supra note 50, § 2320.
143. In effect the "wilderness experience" would be preserved by destroying it. One recalls the military's celebrated statement that it was
necessary to destroy a South Vietnamese village in order to save it.
144. On methods for dispersing visitors, see FSM, supra note 50, §
2323.12.
145. 16 U.S.C.A. § 4601-6a (1974).

1974]

WILDERNESS

only the public at large, and not individual users, should be
charged whatever costs are involved in preserving and maintaining it. At the risk of distraction, we need to digress here to consider this notion more fully, for it has substantial importance to
wilderness management.
The notion reflects, I believe, a misunderstanding of the nature of public goods and the uses of pricing. If wilderness were
a case of a "pure" collective-consumption good whose benefits were enjoyed entirely by the public at large,146 then it would
make sense to spread the cost over the entire public in the form
of taxes. That is hardly the case here. While wilderness preservation does provide some such general public benefits-which is,
after all, the rationale of preservation-it does not follow that
these benefits flow equally to the user and nonuser. Surely it
must be supposed that the backpacker who hikes through the
High Sierras receives some benefit not realized by the Brooklyn cafeteria worker who merely contemplates the mountains
while slingin.g hash. Therefore, even if there were some undifferentiated public benefit derived from wilderness beyond that
measured by the aggregation of individual users, it would not
support a policy of providing it at zero or minimal cost. At the
very most it would support provision at a price somewhere short
of recovery of the full cost of the resource, the deficit reflecting
41
the general social benefit.
The free provision of goods can often be explained not as an
allocation policy but as one of income distribution. In the area
of natural resources management, one encounters this notion
in the form of statements that user fees are inappropriate because they "discriminate" against the poor. But this is something that such fees have in common with all prices; what distinguishes wilderness enjoyment from other enjoyments? Although I do not wish here to embark upon a general discussion of
the economic justice of prices, a couple of pertinent observations are in order.
While in some sense pricing obviously disadvantages the poor
in relation to the affluent, it is a mistake to suppose that a pricing
system reflects nothing more than relative endowments of
wealth; it also reflects relative preferences in the choice of goods.
146. See notes 95-97 supra and accompanying text.
147. See Mfliman, Beneficiary Charges and Efficient Public Expenditure Decisions, in ANALYss AND EVALUATION OF PuBLIc ExPm'wiTuREs: THE PPB SYSTEM, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 291, 310-11 (Joint Economic Comm. Print 1969).
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For this reason, the common supposition that the rich would always outbid the poor in buying wilderness permits is foolish.
Whether they would do so would depend on their individual
preferences-their "utility functions," as the economists would
put it. Smith, whose income is $45,000, may be willing to pay
more for the sight of an eagle in the wilderness than Jones,
whose income is $15,000. But he may niot be. Perhaps he would
prefer to watch the Philadelphia Eagles at $6.00 per game rather
than to search for bald eagles at $6.00 a chance. Moreover,
to the extent any fee system does favor those who are relatively well-to-do, this would be the case even without a fee system because the nongovernment-controlled costs of making a
typical visit serve to exclude the poor from the wilderness.
Thus, a fee system would serve largely to ration demand among
a relatively affluent group. Seen in this light, it is not easy to
become excited about the ethical "problem" of charging the poor
for wilderness enjoyment.
This latter point bears emphasis in view of the sometimes
expressed notion that zero-priced goods are a means of redistributing wealth to the poor. Passing over the general question
whether distributions in kind are a suitable way to accomplish
this aim, 1 48 no possible justification can be found for them in
the context of allocation of wilderness use. To all appearances,
the effect of providing free access to wilderness lands is to shift
wealth from a majority of the public to a minority and from
relatively low-income groups to the well-to-do. 149 Even the
most casual observation should suffice to show the regressive
effect of free provision of outdoor recreational facilities. If the
wilderness backpacker typifies America's needy, we need to rethink our "war on poverty." To talk about helping the needy
by not charging even a moderate charge for the use of this resource thus becomes a cruel hoax on the real poor whose taxes
help to provide the resource, but who cannot afford the travel
or other expenses of using it.
Thus, "equity" would seem not to favor zero or minimal pricing. In any event, it must 'be emphasized that equity is not the
core concern. It is not conceivable that establishing even high
148.

For contrasting views, compare, e.g., X. FRimmA,

AND FREmoxV 190-95 (1962), with Thurow, Cash
fers, 64 Am. EcoN. REV. PAPER & PROC. 190 (1973).

CAPITALISM

Versus In-Kind Trans-

149. Hearings on H.R. 6730 Before the Subcomm. on National Parks
and Recreation of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 11, at 58, 64-65, 106 (1971).
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user fees for wilderness areas will have any meaningful impact
on low, high, or middle-income persons; what is conceivable is
that user fees will have an impact on the use of the wilderness.
This brings us back to our point of departure: the use of prices
as a system of rationing demand. The degree of rationing which
a user-fee system would permit is impossible to estimate in the
absence of experience with such a system in this area. It may
be supposed that it would have little effect on overall wilderness
use, since any practicable (that is, acceptable) fee level would
constitute such a small part of the typical user's costs as to have
slight effect on his general demand. However, properly designed user fees might be expected to affect choices at the margin, determining where or how long one visits an area. This suggests the possibility of controlling some of the congestion in
heavily used areas by means of user fees.
The alternative to price rationing is, of course, administrative rationing. The agencies are now in the process of developing and implementing a permit system, with a limited number of
permits being issued on a first-come-first-served basis. As this is
written, such a system has been implemented in two national
forest wilderness areas in California 5 ° and, I am informed by
Forest Service officials, is under active consideration in several
others; a similar system is currently used in five wilderness areas
administered by the Park Service. These systems provide for reserving permits in advance, and it is contemplated that eventually a national system for making reservations will be established for all national forest wilderness areas for which permits
are required by regional directive, and perhaps even for the
entire Wilderness System.' 51 It is yet too early to know what
150. These are the San Gorgiono and San Jacinto areas in southern
California. The system went into effect in both areas in 1973, although
the use of permits began in 1971. The earlier permits, however, were
not used as restrictive devices but simply for keeping track of visitors
and obtaining visitor information.
151. Various possible methods for reservation have been suggested.
One is to use a well-known private communications system, such as
Western Union; another is to use the post office. A more sensible system
would simply be the establishment of a central federal reservation center
which would handle reservations essentially in the same manner as a
motel reservation system. The cost of such a system would not, of
course, be negligible, but a fee could be charged to cover this cost; in
fact, I am told that the Forest Service contemplates such a fee. This
fee would appear to be outside the restriction of the Land and Water
Conservation Fund Act, see text accompanying note 145 supra, since according to Forest Service officials, it would be based not on use of the
resource but on the provision of the reeservationservice.
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the public acceptance of this rationing will be, although informal
reports indicate that early returns are favorable. 152 In any
event, as a practical matter there is no alternative likely to be
more acceptable if price rationing is eliminated.
Aside from a pricing system, the only possible basis for allocation would be that of administrative selection based on "merit."
This is a rather vague basis of selection which can conceivably
encompass any number of desiderata, but in the plan suggested
by one noted conservationist, Garrett Hardin, the element of
merit is one of physical ability to withstand the rigor of true
wilderness. 53 On first hearing, the suggestion has a tone of reasonableness and plausibility. Certainly it conforms to the basic
assumption that wilderness ought not to be modified to accommodate the "effete" with civilized comforts and aids. However,
if the system is to do no more than exclude those who could not
make the trip without an automobile, it is essentially pointless
because such persons would at present be excluded by a reasonably rigorous enforcement of wilderness quality standards. The
problem is what to do with the excessive number of visitors who
can still "make it" after we have banned vehicles, motors, and
other such aids.
Because it does not focus on the real problem, Hardin's proposal gives no real answer, although we may suppose the logic
of his solution suggests some further standards of physical prowess. These standards, however, would open up huge difficulties,
both practical and normative. The practical problems are fairly
obvious. Who should define the standards: the agencies or the
legislature? What criteria should be used: age, skill, physical
condition, mental alertness? What mechanisms should be available for supervising the exercise of administrative discretion,
either in setting the standards or in applying them to particular
cases? Would every decision be subject to judicial review?
The practical problems of establishing and administering
standards of merit also illuminate the very questionable, normative foundation of Hardin's merit proposal: what is the "merit"
of physical vigor? As mentioned above, we assume maintaining
rigorous standards of environmental purity will serve to exclude
152. I was so informed by Forest Service officials; their conclusions
were not based on formal surveys.
153. See Hearings on Effects of Population Growth on Natural Resources and the Environment Before the Subcomm. on Conservation and
Natural Resources of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 90, 95-96 (1969) (statement of Garrett Hardin).
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many persons not physically able to endure the wilderness on its
own terms. This exclusion is not specifically based on any notion that these are, ethically, more deserving persons. However, to go beyond this incidental exclusion and select only the
most fit clearly assumes that the most fit are the "most deserving." Hardin explains that the physically fit are best able to appreciate the true character of wilderness. Those who make it "on
their own," unaided by mechanical devices, are able to enjoy
not merely the experience of being in a wilderness, but also the
additional "experience of getting there"--that is, of self-achievement. That may be, but once one assumes all persons must minimally be able to make it "on their own," without any artificial
aids (radios, roads, vehicles), is there any basis for further selection on the basis of physical vigor? Is there any reason to suppose that, for example, a 20-year old person for whom the rigors
of wilderness are only moderately challenging appreciates the
wilderness more than the 60-year old person who can. barely endure it? If any generalizations are possible, I would be more inclined to say that just the reverse is likely to be true. But
more to the point, there is simply no real basis in psychology
for drawing any general inferences about the keenness of a person's experience or appreciation from his physical condition.
Even if there were such findings, they would not provide a moral
basis for "merit awards" (in the form of permits to use the wilderness) to those with keener sensitivities.
Whether or not such a notion of merit positively offends
one's ethical sensibilities, it certainly is difficult to explain or
justify by reference to any widely accepted notion of distributive justice. It is curious, to say the least, that Hardin concludes
on the one hand that allocation of visitor permits through the
marketplace should be rejected as "unfair," and on the other that
allocation to those with the keenest physical abilities and mental
faculties should not be. Whatever inequities there may be in
the distribution of wealth that cause persons to be suspicious
about the marketplace, the inequity in the distribution of physical vigor or mental sensitivity is no less pervasive. If one
measures ethical merit independently of original endowment,
there is no a priori reason to prefer health over wealth in the
distribution of "merit goods.' 1 54
154. Indeed, the contrary was once argued with some plausibility by
Henry Simons:
Let us imagine a competitive economy, without inheritance,
where all persons have substantially equal talents for straight
thinking, imagination, salesmanship, and chicanery, but are
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VI. CONCLUSION
The controversy over wilderness preservation has raised virtually the entire range of basic issues confronted in federal land
management. For the land manager, all the questions concerning land-use allocation policy are posed: should any large land
area be given over to a single use or to nonuse; by what criteria
should such lands be chosen; how should the trade-offs between
economic use and preservation be measured? The allocation
questions lead to other questions of administrative management: how shall land use be regulated to conserve the resource;
should use of the resource be rationed by a pricing system or by
administrative controls? And underlying these substantive policy questions are the questions concerning the structure and
processes of decision: what should be the role of public participation in making decisions; what relative weights should be
given respectively to national and local public interests; should
decisions be aimed at achieving an optimal balance of resource
use within particular regions or over the nation as a whole?
Finally, there is the further question for decision-makers outside
the agencies, notably those in the legislature and in the courts:
how much discretion should the agency have in answering all of
the above questions?
Quite obviously none of these questions has produced anything resembling a consensus among initerested parties. Perhaps
none ever will. Certainly there are some very substantial imped.
iments to be overcome, as I noted earlier. One of these is the
orientation of national forest policy generally, with its emphasis on regional and local interests and needs. Giving preeminent
consideration to regional and local land-use interests appears to
complicate land-use policy. For one thing, more individual decienormously unequal in physical strength. Here, of course, the
millionaires will be the persons with strong backs; and the apology of productivity ethics will be that they are entitled to share
in the social income according to their respective differential
contributions (productivity). A dose of Calvinist theology
would make this doctrine more palatable to the masses; but persons of a critical temper might be led to restate the implications
and to revise the conclusions simply by reversing them. If a
person has been greatly favored by the Creator in the dispensation of rare physical blessings, it is hard to regard that initial
good fortune as a basis for preferential claims against his fellows
with respect to scarce goods whose distribution is amenable to
some deliberate, human control. Indeed, one is almost obliged
to admit the reasonableness of the opposite system of ethical
bookkeeping, whereby rare physical blessings would be debited
to the recipient's account with the universe.
H. SIMONS, PE~sNx INcqmp TAxA.TOx 12-13 (1938),
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sions must be made, not only adding to the burdens of land-use
administration, but also increasing the potential for conflict.
For another, a focus on local and regional interests precludes the
possibility of trade-offs across geographical regions. Specialization of land use is limited in favor of achieving balance within
each geographical area.
Such a policy of decentralized land use is not without its
political and social virtues, the same virtues that underlie the
federal structure of the nation. Whether these virtues require
the degree of balkanization that has characterized land-use policy-and wilderness policy in particular-is debatable. However,
as it is not possible to debate it here, I shall leave this as merely
a provocative assertion.
The other major impediment to consensus on wilderness
preservation is what I earlier termed the "holy war" aspect of
the controversy. The struggle over wilderness is not simply a
conflict of practical interests, but of basic social values as well.
Such conflicts are hard to resolve by consensus. The "naturalist"
who deeply believes the world is too preoccupied with material
goods is unlikely to be persuaded that wilderness should be sacrificed to produce more of them, just as the "utilitarian" is unlikely to be enchanted with the idea that utilitarian benefits
should be sacrificed to preserve the spiritual values of wilderness.
What this suggests is that it is probably futile to seek consensus on the broad issues of wilderness preservation. Attention to the general, abstract issues can only exacerbate the
conflict among partisans on both sides of the preservation controversy and make compromise more difficult. Instead the general issues must be broken down into the smallest components
and each of these examined as an individual problem, hopefully
with at least a modest degree of rationality and a minimum
amount of moralizing.

